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In the design and operation of the next-generation naval surface combatants, more and 
more attention has been paid to increase the system’s affordability, survivability and 
mission effectiveness. The Aerospace Systems Design Laboratory (ASDL) at the Georgia 
Tech proposed a framework referred to as Integrated Reconfigurable Intelligent Systems 
(IRIS) as a solution to satisfy such Navy’s requirements. The main effort is to develop an 
integrated dynamic Modeling and Simulation (M&S) environment for understanding the 
behavior of the next generation of naval ship which is envisioned to be self-assessing, 
self-predicting, self-planning and self-executing. The integrated M&S environment is a 
key enabler for facilitating the system design and operation of the naval complex systems, 
such as design space exploration, technology evaluation, and scenario analysis.  
 
The following report details the progress that has been made by ASDL in developing and 
applying the IRIS concept for the period of February 24, 2010 to February 23, 2011.  
Progress has been made on three individual tasks associated with resilience analysis and 
modeling and simulation. A resilience assessment framework was developed to for 
enhancing the analysis and design of more resilient systems in order to improve the ship 
survivability and mission effectiveness. The integrated M&S was further improved for 
evaluating the system’s reconfigurability through studying the system’s ability for 
resource allocation and rupture identification and isolation. The graph-based component 
surrogate modeling approach was implemented to a larger fluid system for damage 
modeling and survivability analysis. New achievements for this period include: 
 
• Defined resilient systems in engineering based on the predefined system resilience 
characteristics for better performing resilience assessment and design  
• Developed a framework of equations for quantitative measurements in support of 
a resilience assessment method 
• Formulated a beam model and implemented the resilience analysis method to it to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the framework 
• Investigated the methods for time step control for simulation accuracy and 
computational expense tradeoff 
• Proposed an approach for time stepping using an RKF23 algorithm and 
implemented it on an example problem  
• Created surrogate models for the YP and CW-RSAD models for damage 
modeling and simulation 
• Conducted analysis based on damage simulation for enhancing survivability of 
the fluid systems 
• Finished 3 journal papers which are under review or in progress 
Task 1: Methods for Improving System Effectiveness 
through more Resilient Systems Design 
1.1. Introduction  
Current trends in naval ship design have resulted in increased onboard system 
complexity. Increasing requirements for onboard safety, capability and performance at a 
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reduced cost have given way to the installation of more advanced engineering systems. 
Enhancement solutions, such as automation or multi-way communication within 
subsystems result in a dramatic increase in complexity, which additionally emphasizes 
the limitations of traditional design approaches. 
 
. 
Figure 1: Complex System Design Cycle: Balancing Effectiveness, Performance And 
Safety 
 
Advanced capability translates to increased functionality, with the latter requiring the 
addition of subsystems for executing the additional functions. Consequently, more 
subsystems and more internal connections increase overall system complexity. 
Complexity contributes to operational risk, with the possible emergence of extra modes 
of failure or support of health or system performance degradation. In conclusion, except 
for the unavoidable risk around mission operations, increased system complexity itself 
only increases uncertainty in mission performance, safety and survivability. As Figure 1 
explains, increasing the risk on mission performance and system health, leads to the need 
for revising the design requirements, in order to ensure safety and survivability, while 
maintaining the desired capability and performance levels.   
 
The problem concentrates on investigating possible methods for improving mission 
effectiveness, in a way that, the required capability levels are achieved, while safety and 
survivability are maintained. According to the Defense Appropriation Act of 2004, 
effectiveness can be improved by including survivability in the design process as a key 
performance parameter (Rains, 1984). Survivability is a critical safety measure, namely 
leading to the equal consideration of susceptibility, vulnerability, and recoverability 
features for ensuring a more robust design. Survivability includes the ability to avoid 
system detection (Susceptibility) through signature management and to avoid damage 





Safety management is required for exploring all possible options to improve safety and 
survivability through design. Risk reduction should be substantial under multiple mission 
environments, also requiring a robust systems design approach as well. Two options are 
possible, to either retrofit safety solutions at the detailed design phase, or consider safety 
as a major design objective that is taken into account from the conceptual design phase.  
 
Figure 2: Moving Safety Early In the Design Process (Christensen, 1999)  
 
For the first option, safety gaps and risks are identified when the design is almost final, 
and additional technologies or modifications are incorporated for safety enhancement. 
There is no guarantee however that the architecture would allow for seamless inclusion of 
these updates, and it is quite certain that the additional weight will incur extra costs and 
possible degradation of the performance targets. Hence, a redesign cycle may be 
necessary, if capability and mission performance requirements are eventually not met. 
For these reasons, Christensen et al. advocate for the second option, according to which, 
safety requirements are considered in the early design phases and system survivability is 
treated as a design objective.   
 
With the IRIS initiative supporting conceptual design methods for more survivable and 
mission effective naval systems, an opportunity is presented for exploring options on 
bringing survivability as a design objective. In other words, similarly to how architectures 
are capable for particular mission performance requirements, one could argue that these 
architectures are fit for being “inherently” survivable as well, for certain range of mission 
expectations and environmental risk. Traditional design approaches focus on 
performance, while safety-driven approaches seek for more robust architectures, usually 
by technology infusion for safety, automation and intelligence, on a finalized 
configuration. The great challenge however, is to explore engineering approaches for 
implementing an equivalent functionality and flexibility on the architecture in parallel to 
its development for performance, especially given the highly uncertain operational 




In the following sections, background information on the current State-of-the-Art in 
safety and survivability engineering is provided, concentrating on naval applications in 
particular. These involve relevant safety concepts, assessment methods and design 
frameworks that are currently used or investigated for further development. The last 
sections outline the findings related to the research plan for Task 3. 
1.2. Background 
It has been argued that system effectiveness is a function of system capability, 
survivability and availability (Habayeb, 1987). Capability is prescribed through the 
design requirements, and even though mission uncertainty can affect how capable a 
system is in practice, it is still bounded by theoretical mission expectations. Availability 
is linked to mission logistics, and is also implicitly linked to system reliability and 
survivability. Survivability appears to be the attribute that a designer would give priority 
over other contributions to system effectiveness. It is the attribute that if taken as a design 
objective, it ensures that the system remains capable and available during the mission. 
 
For the military engineering community, there have been several frameworks that 
recommend design approaches for improving operational survivability. However, not all 
of them are advocating for early survivability considerations, where the architecture is 
optimized to accommodate them as well. Given that survivability is indeed enhancing 
system effectiveness, the fundamental objective for this initiative is to explore alternative 
and emerging options for improving system survivability, so that system effectiveness is 
maximized and multi-mission system capability are enabled. For this purpose, a short 
review of where the State-of-the-art (SoA) is on system effectiveness analysis and 
survivability-based design is presented.  
 
State-of-the-Art in military system effectiveness analysis approaches 
The Weapon System Effectiveness Industry Advisory Committee (WSIEAC) has 
finalized a methodology for system effectiveness analysis in 1965. The WSIEAC model 
is based on the enumeration of the significant system states over the entire mission. For 
instance, a state can be the condition at which a system is available and operable, namely 
a state in availability and a state in operability can comprise a state at the system level. 
Concerning metrics that are used to describe these states, there are different approaches in 
the selected sets of metrics for describing effectiveness, strongly depending on the system 
point of view. For example, system effectiveness at the mission or the campaign level is 
typically measured by numbers or percentages of systems killed/survived in battle. At the 
system level on the other hand, the focus shifts towards individual events and 
characteristics such as type of system, type of attack, vulnerability, casualties, and 
recovery time. Hootman (2006) has conducted an extensive literature survey on Measures 
of Merit (MOMs) for system effectiveness, concluding that the metrics framework by the 
WSEIAC initiative by the MORS society is very representative of what the SoA is at. 
System effectiveness is being broken down in sets of contributing metrics that reflect the 




The Air force Research Laboratory (AFRL) has introduced a probabilistic approach for 
system effectiveness analysis. It relies on performance-based measures, taking into 
account the mission objectives and probability of success criteria, as well as system 
performance under damage propagation that is estimated through companion damage and 
fail prediction models. The U.S. Navy has also developed a framework for evaluating 
system effectiveness. A good discussion of this framework is provided by Hanifari et al., 
through the naval system effectiveness manual NAVMAT P3941-B. As Habayeb also 
argues, system effectiveness is broken down in availability, dependability and capability. 
Further breakdown of the three “-ilities” is based on factors that contribute to improving 
system effectiveness are identified (credits), as well as the ones that add cost to the design 
of the system (debits). This is a useful first step towards setting up a cost-effectiveness 




Figure 3: Observations On System Effectiveness Analysis Approaches  
 
Figure 3 outlines some of the basic observations on current SoA. A basic observation is 
that system effectiveness is a probabilistic measure by nature. With the highly uncertain 
mission operating conditions in the mission environment (Mcmanus, 2007), it is argued 
that a probabilistic approach is necessary. Deterministic approaches would not capture 
the variability of external factors (equivalent to noise factors), and that solution 
robustness could not be guaranteed. This is true for most formulations that are available 
for quantifying system effectiveness.  Indeed, another observation to make is that "system 
effectiveness" holds different meanings for different communities and applications, while 
organizations tailor their definitions and methods to apply to very specific problems 
(Soban, 2001).  
 
To evaluate effectiveness, it is necessary to make an assessment against goals for 
successful mission completion, but that is not the only requirement. Given that system 
effectiveness strongly depends on changing environmental conditions under which the 
 
 6 
system performs its mission, success is measured by how well the system can achieve its 
mission goals under varying external or internal conditions. All systems carry a mission 
success potential and possess a certain level of capability by design. Capability-based 
design is pre-defining the system performance effect (or system capability) and 
investigates the solution by generating all possible design alternatives and selecting the 
optimal (subject to constraints and requirements) that can deliver the same capability. 
System effectiveness design methods seek for a system that can still be effective at most 
tasks, even during its post-threat experience segment of its mission. A capable system 
must also be an effective system, so that built-in capability can be guaranteed, even after 
experiencing threats, attacks or possible accidents during its mission. 
 
State-of-the-Art in survivability design and analysis approaches 
Survivability-based design has proliferated after WWII, mainly applied on fighter aircraft 
design. Robert Ball offers great historical insight on how survivability became part of the 
design for modern fighters and his approach is quite representative of the industry’s SoA 
. His methodology combines survivability assessment methods with a set of susceptibility 
and vulnerability reduction concepts. The ultimate goal is to examine the impact of 
possible design enhancements on system survivability and the associated costs of the 
upgrades. Trade studies determine both the benefits and downgrades in system 
performance, against the effectiveness and cost for each survivability enhancement 
feature.  
 
An alternative resource is the Aerospace Systems Survivability Handbook Series, which 
was developed by the Joint Technical Coordinating Committee for Aircraft Survivability 
(JTCG/AS) to provide guidance to government and industry survivability managers, 
engineers and analysts involved in systems acquisition (JTCG/ASV1Y2001). The 
survivability system design and development process follows from a set of stated 
survivability requirements for a system and evolves throughout the entire system 
acquisition process. The process begins system requirements and extends through the 
development, test, and evaluation of an engineering or prototype model of the system.  
 
Switching to naval systems, SoA methods are quite similar to methods used for aerospace 
vehicles. Most approaches suggest design enhancement strategies, that are based on 
current susceptibility, vulnerability requirements, but these are methodologies for 
assessing survivability available, as well. Similarly to (JTCG/AS), there have been 
equivalent initiatives within the naval systems community that promote survivability as a 
design discipline. Regarding naval applications, the OPNAV P-86-4-99 instruction 
(OPNAV, 1999) is the most popular amongst naval engineers, providing definitions, 
metrics, and design processes for susceptibility/vulnerability reduction. According to this 
procedure, survivability is improved by focusing only on vulnerability, implying that 
susceptibility reduction and recoverability improvement are expected consequences of 
the former. 
 
Alternatively, discipline-based survivability-based design approaches are focusing on 
improving total ship survivability by bringing focus on a particular system category. 
Power systems design is an example, with CPT Doerry's zonal design methods (Doerry, 
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2007) that emphasize on dynamic survivability by monitoring of the quality and 
continuity of service (QoS).  
 
Survivability-based design is applicable for the civil sector, with the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) and the SAFER-EURORO (EURORO, 2003) initiative for 
merchant and ferry ships, being the most prominent and commonly adopted. Academia is 
also supporting the idea of survivability-based design, with researchers introducing their 
respective recommendations on survivability assessment and enhancement frameworks. 
Recent efforts include Dr. Sudhoff's survivability-based approach for increasing the 
operability of naval power systems and the risk and scenario-based survivability design 
(Brown, 2003) by Dr. Alan Brown.  
 
State-of-the-Art in survivability assessment methods 
All methods discussed previously have clearly demonstrated that is impossible to design 
for survivability without being able to assess survivability and in some cases test the 
design, so that a list of necessary enhancements can be identified. In this section, the 
focus is concentrated on the assessment methods and frameworks available. Most of them 
have already been mentioned as part of methods for survivability design, such as the kill 
chain scenario approach, TSSA or IMO assessment. On the more practical side, 
consulting and engineering companies that work close with military authorities have 
developed their own environments for survivability based design and assessment, with 
some (e.g. MOTISS by Alion Technologies) of them to be highly sophisticated stand-
alone computer applications that can be used as independent assessment modules for any 
survivability design methodology. 
 
While reviewing all SoA techniques and methods, some observations have been made, in 
an effort to understand what research directions one must follow.  First, there is no 
standard design method for survivability design, even though most approaches follow a 
common logic. Typical survivability enhancement features, such as component 
redundancy, separation and shielding are immediate techniques that can be properly 
applied to the design based on conceptual sizing. However, each method is unique in 
determining the extent of such enhancements and the type of survivability that each 
enhancement would seek to improve (susceptibility, vulnerability or recoverability).  
 
For multi-mission capable architectures, robust design methods are adopted, which fall 
under the traditional design approaches are based on optimizing naval systems for 
performance, based on a limited number of mission scenarios. A robust solution 
represents a system that in theory would be better prepared to perform multiple mission 
acts and withstand a larger spectrum of unexpected events. Unexpected however does not 
imply “never seen before” incident, thus the robust solution is as good as the scenarios or 
sample incidents, which the architecture is designed to be immune against. In 
survivability language, robustness is essentially improving vulnerability (probability of 
kill if hit) reduction. Robustness supports a reactive approach to how the architecture 
maintains its effectiveness under hazards and environmental mission uncertainty. Robust 
architectures are usually not characterized by design embedded internal processes, that 
actively detect and avoid threats or minimize uncertainty, or active reconfigurability 
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strategies that would introduce internal recovery mechanisms for the case of component 
kill that may result in total system kill.  
 
Resilience Engineering 
For addressing the shortcomings on current SoA design approaches, new concepts have 
been investigated, as possible enablers for more survivable system designs. The most 
promising was that of resilient systems. Resilience engineering is a recent emerging 
discipline on understanding threats, accident and damage propagation, as well as how 
systems must be designed to conform to changes that occur around it, for the purpose of 
withstanding adverse effects and maintaining its mission effectiveness.  
 
For a system to be resilient, it must adjust its functioning prior to or following changes 
and disturbances so that it can go on working even after a major mishap or in the 
presence of continuous stress, mainly by being able to be proactive on safety. A resilient 
system is based on a three-sided functionality. It must be able to anticipate, monitor and 
respond to environment al change or emerging threats.  Resilience can be viewed in 
conjunction to system safety, survivability, reliability and robustness, and except for a 
system, resilience can be defined for a structure, a particular material, a network of 
systems, a communications network or even an organization.  
 
State-of-the-Art in Resilience assessment methods 
Up to present, there have been attempts on quantification of resilience and most of them 
appear to be system specific and adjusted to requirements and expectations for the design 
and operation of a particular system. Resilience engineering as a discipline is interpreted 
by each scientific community, in a fashion that is supporting their own needs on certain 
system types and applications. Thus, resilience metrics are quite subjective and specific 
to their application or domain of use.  
 
The lack of a standard analytical or quantitative resilience assessment framework has 
sparked the interest of individual researchers towards establishing a unified approach 
(Madni and Jackson, 2009). Except for systems engineering, other possible applications 
may include to economics and business, or industrial and organizational resilience. 
Regarding engineering applications, resilience makes sense for materials, structures, 
infrastructures, architectures and other complex engineering systems. Resilience also 
applies on networks, such as supply chains or air transportation systems.  
 
A survey of published resilience assessment techniques has been conducted and has 
revealed possible places to start from for an assessment method. Except for Madni et al. 
(2009) who propose a generic, yet heuristics based approach on resilience assessment, 
there have been other domain-specific approaches. Civil engineering appears to be the 
leading scientific field regarding resilience engineering, with suggested frameworks on 
infrastructures (Vugrin, 2010), materials (Mitchell, 2009), and indirectly through resilient 
control for structures (Haddad, 1998). Other applications could include network systems, 
namely communication networks, or air transportation systems (Reed, 2004).  
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1.2.1. Technical Objectives 
As the significance of system safety and survivability has been thoroughly addressed in 
earlier sections, resilience engineering has been introduced as a conceptual direction for 
exploring options on enhancing system survivability and thus produces more effective 
systems.  In other words, it should be investigated how all underlying philosophies of 
resilience engineering can translate into a systems engineering framework.  
 
Yet, system resilience is subjectively defined and several iterations are needed to reach 
consensus for global definitions, areas of applicability, and assessment frameworks. The 
latter would be instrumental for integrating system safety and survivability as a product 
and process characteristic in early conceptual system design. Hence, the main objective 
with this task is to investigate the concept of resilience in the context of system safety and 
suggest a complete framework for assessing resilience in systems engineering.  
 
With this objective in mind and from the lessons learned through investigating the SoA, 
the following research questions must addressed: 
• If a resilient system did exist, how would it look like and behave in a dynamic 
environment?   
• How a resilient system does differ from a survivable or safe system? 
• What framework for assessing system resilience can be selected and developed in 
a way to test system robustness and resilience? 
• What small scale system exhibits the basic behavioral characteristics of a large 
scale complex naval system, in order to use it as a canonical problem for the 
assessment framework development?  
• What analysis process should be formulated for associating system resilience to 
survivability and effectiveness?  
 
As a result of the previous questions, these are the necessary research subtasks that are 
discussed in the following: 
 
1. Clarification of key words and concepts around system resilience and in contrast 
to relevant concepts.  
2. Proposition of a theoretical framework for resilience assessment, on which a 
system design methodology will be subsequently built upon. A canonical problem 
based on a small scale dynamic system is used for development, testing and 
demonstration purposes. 
3. Demonstration of the methodology, using a baseline naval architecture.  
1.2.2. Proposed Work for Task 1 
 
The ultimate goal of this research initiative is to deliver a systems engineering 
methodology that allows for the analysis and design of more resilient complex systems. 
Figure 4 describes a general template of steps towards the acquisition of more resilient 
designs, based on a naval system application. This generic approach contains the 
experimentation and design framework, in order to support design space exploration, 
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 PM of Baseline Design




 Initial Damage 
Prediction Model
 (e.g DOMINO)




Identify Direction of Improvement
(based on robustness/resiliency requirements




Figure 4: General Template of A Methodology For Resilient Systems Design 
 
Despite the fact that it could be brought to a point that is allows for the design of resilient 
systems, it only includes “placeholders” for the necessary steps to be taken for resilient 
design. In other words, if the characteristics of resilient systems are not clarified and the 
appropriate steps are not included in the method, then it is no different than any systems 
engineering design method. For instance, adaptability is one of the characteristic features 
of resilient systems. Reconfiguration is one possible enabler for the degree of adaptability 
that a system requires to belong under resilient architectures. Thus the method must 
account for allowing the development and testing of different reconfiguration strategies 
through intelligent algorithms and selecting the most suitable for a given architecture.  
Concluding, this leads to a preliminary study, where key words and concepts around 
system resilience must be clarified and in contrast to relevant concepts. 
 
The originally proposed subtask was suggesting the following: 
 
Subtask 1.1: Optimize two system architectures, using robust and resilient systems 
design respectively.  
 
Even though this task would not require an elaborate design methodology for the 
acquisition of both solutions, it would still require iterations or a verification step that the 
resilient system actually satisfies some basic resilience criteria. At this time, knowledge 
about what makes a system resilient or how it behaves is still uncertain, and furthermore, 
quantitative means of assessing resilience are unavailable. Thus, it has been deemed 
necessary to revise subtask 3.1 to a new work statement that brings focus on better 
understanding system resilience and suggests possible ways for evaluating and assessing 




Updated Subtask 1.1: Define resilient systems in engineering and develop a framework 
of equations for quantitative measurements in support of a resilience assessment method, 
based on the predefined system resilience characteristics.   
 
For instructional purposes and for aiding the method development, a small scale “pilot” 
problem is devised and implemented. The problem involves an elastic/plastic cantilever 
beam, which is experiencing external dynamic load distributions of varying shape. At the 
same time, the beam is assumed to withstand a certain amount of uniform load, as its 
“mission” assignment. As a result of this input stimulus, the beam is experiencing a 
deflection from its original horizontal equilibrium position, along with a certain amount 
of curvature that changes its shape. The strain that the beam is experiencing and 
determines the deflection and the curvature are immediate functions of the beam’s shape, 
material and the effect of any actuator control system that may be included in the 





Figure 5: Simple Beam Model For Testing The Proposed Resilience Assessment 
Framework 
 
Elements that are not part of the beam itself are included to assist the beam in 
maintaining its equilibrium shape and withstand the destabilizing effects. The material 
inherently carries similar abilities, however what makes the beam more resilient is the 
design selection for configuring the external parameters that supports the beam’s mission. 
As one may understand, the selection of such an experimental setup is anything but 
random, basically aiming on creating a conceptual and functional replicate of a complex 
system with similar functions, behavior and characteristics. More about the analogies of 
the beam pilot problem to a large scale dynamic system are discussed in the following 
sections.  
 
As part of the theoretical foundation of the resilience assessment approach, a set of 
responses at different operational levels have been defined and require data that will be 
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provided by the output of the simulation. Such metrics are the figures of merit for the 
particular design solution representing the corresponding architecture and will determine 
its performance based on survivability and mission effectiveness criteria. At the 
subsystem level, subsystem performance measures can be obtained (e.g. voltage outputs, 
coolant mass flow rates). Given a scenario per system configuration, system sensitivities 
and correlations of measures of performance (MoP) to scenario changes can be identified. 
Such measures are mostly conditional probabilities of achieving an outcome response, 
given events that occurred earlier, as defined by the scenario event tree analysis.  More 
about the layered structure of resilience measures and the overall effectiveness 
assessment is discussed in the following sections.  
 
Enhancement of resilience is possible through redundant components, strategic placement 
of critical components, sophisticated architectural design, lighter materials and enhanced 
shielding. A resilient architecture must be flexible, and this is possible through a high 
degree of reconfigurability. Mission reconfigurability is achieved with controllers that 
support a series of automated functions for sensing, analyzing and selecting an 
appropriate plan for withstanding and neutralizing the effects of a disturbance. Given that 
the resilience assessment framework becomes available through subtask 3.1, resilience 
enhancement concerns are addressed through subtask 3.2: 
 
Subtask 1.2: Demonstration of total ship mission effectiveness through resilience 
assessment, while comparing two architectures   under the same mission 
 
With this subtask, the main objective is to demonstrate the resilience assessment 
framework for naval system architecture. As a baseline, a notional naval ship design is 
required to be the starting point for the implementation of the method. The common 
baseline is a version of a Yard Patrol craft (YP). A synthesis and sizing tool is used for 
generating the geometry and the inner systems distribution. Paramarine is the software 
that has been used to create this baseline and requires a certain amount of information, 
such as ship geometry, engineering subsystems, acquisition and operations cost 
breakdown, mission profiles, threats and hazards and local environmental conditions.  
 
The effectiveness assessment tool has been formulated through a 3-layered combination 
of Vugrin’s resilience assessment tool, the TSSA survivability assessment method and 
the naval effectiveness evaluation framework (NAVMAT). Initially, the demonstration 
will only refer to the original baseline. There is an unlimited portfolio of combinations of 
alternative configurations and mission scenarios that allow for enabling cost-
effectiveness tradeoff studies for each solution. For a complete study, the following 
experiments are necessary: 
 
1. Two configurations (baseline and enhanced) that are assessed for the same 
mission scenarios. 
2. One selected configuration for a series of different mission scenarios  
 
In this demonstration, option 2 is adopted. On a larger scale, both experiments can 
support the design space exploration and the contraction of the solution space to only a 
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few selected solutions that will eventually lead to the most resilient design. It should be 
expected however, that while the resilient solution demonstrates improvement in terms of 
safety and survivability, it might also incur increased development and maintenance cost. 
1.3. Experimental Results and Discussion  
Redefining resilience in a systems engineering context is necessary for developing the 
resilience assessment framework. This framework of metrics and processes is addressed 
by task 3.1. Work on task 3.2 concludes with the method demonstration results on 
baseline naval system architecture.  
1.3.1. Framework for System Resilience Assessment (Subtask 1.1) 
The main objective of the first task is to further investigate the concept of resilience in the 
context of system safety and suggest a complete framework for assessing resilience in 
systems engineering. Given the observed patterns of system behavior, a set of resilience 
metrics are proposed, essentially capturing the three types of system survivability 
(susceptibility, vulnerability and recoverability) with respect to the system's dynamic 
responses. System functionality determines the dynamic responses of highest interest, 
such as mission performance outputs (e.g. mobility, stability) power delivery (e.g. electric 
or mechanical power) and system health monitoring (e.g. cooling and temperature levels, 
structural integrity etc.). Effects from emerging and unexpected adverse behaviors due to 
changing operating conditions and requirements should also be captured by the 
framework and included for the resilience assessment.  
 
To break the above objective further down, the following questions need to be addressed 
and lead us to answers: 
  
• What is a unified definition of the following terms related to resilience: Resilience 
Engineering, resilient systems and their characteristics? 
• How is this definition different than earlier attempts to define system resilience 
that were more relevant to system safety, reliability, survivability, security, 
robustness? 
• Are there metrics from existing assessment frameworks that could also be 
appropriate for resilience assessment, based on a given definition and 
assumptions? 
• How could the Goal Question Metric (GQM) method by INCOSE be applied to 
generate metrics, based on characteristics of resilient systems and their typical 
expected behavior? 
• With a given set of metrics, is there a formal analytical procedure that could be 
used to demonstrate the goodness of the selected metrics?  
• If so, what figures of merit for metric goodness can be employed?  
• Is a sensitivity analysis adequate, or more tests would be required to demonstrate 
the goodness of the metrics? 
 
Defining a resilient system in engineering 
Historically, resilience engineering has been regarded as an emerging discipline, initiated 
in 1973 by C.S. Holling, in a publication regarding the resilience and stability of 
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ecological systems (Holling, 1973). Madni describes resilience engineering as a 
discipline that is concerned with monitoring organizational decision making with explicit 
identification and monitoring of risks (Madni and Jackson, 2009). Amongst other forms, 
there is economic and business resilience of a financial organization and on a similar 
realm industrial and organizational resilience. Resilience also applies on networks and on 
a larger scale, resilience for socio-ecological systems is found.  
 
Holling’s definition emphasizes that a resilient system must adopt to change and be able 
to absorb any adverse effects that result from this change, while maintaining its physical 
and functional integrity. If these features are mapped against the three types of 
survivability (susceptibility, vulnerability and recoverability), it appears that adapting and 
absorbing would fit under vulnerability reduction and maintaining integrity pairs with 
recoverability. A resilient response by the system would include the ability to efficiently 
adjust to non-favorable influences rather than to resist them. Such ability could be 
embedded as collection of internal functionalities and be the basis for certain active 
features for susceptibility/vulnerability reduction and recoverability increase. It is 
important to address susceptibility reduction and recoverability for both the system and 
its mission ability. With this annexation, resilient systems carry extra abilities that would 
clearly make them more distinguishable from robust systems.  
 
 
Figure 6: Safety Concepts And Their Relevance Against Disturbance Type And 
Origin 
 
For the purpose of investigating resilience in engineering systems, Holling’s definition 
has been extended to the following:  
 
System resilience is the ability of the system to monitor sense and warn about an 
incoming threat, through adaptation to change for effectively absorbing and persisting to 
adverse effects, while maintaining subsystem connectivity and integrity, preventing 
system loss and fully recovering so as to perform the system’s mission.  
 
Similarly, resilient systems refer to the class of robust systems that carry the ability of 
actively monitoring, sensing and warning about an incoming threat, through adaptation to 
change for effectively absorbing and persisting to adverse effects, while maintaining 
 
 15 
subsystem connectivity and integrity, preventing system loss and fully recovering the 
system’s mission. Finally, resilience engineering is a division of safety engineering that 
seeks to investigate and propose advanced design concepts and technologies for the 
analysis and design of more resilient systems. While safety concepts are overlapping 
when assessed with respect to threat origin and intent, system resilience would be 
relevant for any kind of threat, as Figure 6 advocates 
 
A resilient system is a robust solution to a great extent, yet it requires the system to be 
more proactive for withstanding and recovering from a threat and its resulting events. To 
elaborate further on distinguishing resilient from robust systems, a list of associated 
features has been created and grouped against the three components of survivability. The 
features were extracted from the earlier definitions of resilient systems. In Figure 7, the 




Figure 7: Characteristics Of Resilient Systems And Comparison To Robust Systems 
 
There is no standard metric for measuring resilience. Moreover, there is no standard 
analytical method that prescribes experiments and measures for system resilience 
assessment. Resilience engineering is still at its infancy stage and researchers are 
currently proposing ideas for metrics and methods. Most approaches are specific to their 
application or domain of use. For instance, Madni and Jackson (2009) have proposed the 
following generic types of metrics: 
• Time & cost to restore operations, configuration, functionality and performance. 
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• Degree to which pre-disruption state has been restored. 
• Number of potential disruptions avoided. 
• Adaptability within time and cost constraints. 
Hollnagel (Hollnagel et al., 2006) also proposed a similar set of qualitative resilience 
measures, with time scale being a significant factor, either for disruptions or impact on 
system recovery. More specifically: 
• Buffering capacity is a general estimate for system robustness, namely its ability 
to withstand the change it is experiencing.  
• Self-restructuring capability is related to the ability to recover from the occurred 
change. 
• System or subsystem adaptation as an aggregate estimate of the system’s total 
response to the disruption.  
 
Figure 8: Typical Dynamic Response To Disruption 
 
Richards (Richards, 2009) has proposed an epoch-based representation of system 
response time histories of system response, under disruptions or performance 
degradations. Having defined the essential functions that represent value delivery and 
mission accomplishment are time-based, Figure 8 shows a typical system output 
degradation of system output. The output is the source of characteristic measures that are 
aggregated to following metrics: 
• Time-weighted average performance degradation UL  
 
 TL UUU −= 0  (1) 
 
and is the difference between initial utility value U0 and the time weighted 
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TATA =  (3) 
 
with TAT defined as the average time above threshold. 
 
System-Mission States 
System effectiveness depends on the system’s ability to successfully perform its mission 
and maintain its overall health and integrity under changing external or internal 
conditions. When a disturbance interferes with normal and stable operating conditions, 
the system can experience transitions through a set of states. These states are constituted 
by states that refer to either mission performance or system health. Correlating these 




Figure 9: System Health - Mission States 
 
To illustrate the previous points, consider both mission status and system health to fall 
under one of these three states each: intact (OK), degraded (reversible) and degraded 
(irreversible). They refer to the degradation in mission performance ability and system 
health after the disturbance. The boundaries that mark the transition between states are 
defined by thresholds associated to system and mission characteristics. Not all 
combinations of states are feasible though. As an example, Figure 9 displays all possible 
combinations of states, along with feasibility check. The feasibility check however 
definitely depends on the system type and its mission requirements.  
 
The states are dynamic, given that they depend on the system dynamic response to a 
disturbance. In other words, one must analyze the time histories for system outputs, and 
determine the state according to a set of given thresholds. To illustrate this point, a set of 
notional response diagrams were constructed. The diagrams could also show the 
alternative paths that a more resilient system follows, due to its internal abilities of 
preventing further degradation and recovering. The responses that follow could refer to 
either the mission ability status or the system’s health, so let’s assume that they describe 




For the first case, the system maintains its mission performing ability along with its 
integrity after a single disturbance, as shown in Figure 10. This is the most favorable case 
where the effects of the disturbance are either weakening until they reach the system or 
the system is robust enough that it manages to neutralize the effects and become 
insensitive to the threat. This behavior is an expected feature of a resilient system, yet it is 
not the sole defining characteristic of it. The degradation is driving the actual 
performance value below target value; however, it does not go below the reversible fail 
threshold Vmt(min). This threshold defines a recoverability zone (or safety buffer), within 
which the system can maintain its integrity and recover by itself.   
 
Figure 10: Reversible Response to A Disturbance 
 
From the survivability perspective, this degradation diagram describes the vulnerability 
and the recoverability of the system. In a real example, the system response is not 
perfectly continuous and smooth. Instead it would be more turbulent or oscillatory, as an 
outcome of suppressing possible instability through robustness. Overall, this behavior 
describes a survivable response, with output value restoration to its original level.  
 
In the second case, the degradation reaches a minimum point below the irreversibility 
threshold Vst(min). This threshold separates the region where the system can reverse its 
degradation from a region where it does not have the ability to recover by design. This 
boundary however is a natural boundary that depends on the certain capability of this 
design. Figure 11 is showing health degradation that reaches the irreversibility threshold. 
A conventional architecture would show minimal signs of recovery efforts, but chances 
are that it would further degrade and experience a catastrophic failure. This outcome is 
represented by the light blue line in Figure 11.  
 
If the design is more resilient, then it could be capable of overriding the threshold rule 
and steer itself away from the ultimate system fail threshold. Thus health degradation 
could become reversible, as it is shown by the dark blue line in Figure 11, in contrast to 





Figure 11:  Partially Reversible Response to Disturbance, With Survivability 
Enhancements 
 
The effects of incorporating survivability enhancing technologies into the architecture 
can prevent the steep degradation. Furthermore, if architectures are designed to be 
inherently resilient, it may even allow the system to bypass the steep degradations. 
Survivability enhancements support vulnerability reduction and recoverability, given that 
the degradation could not be prevented. Resilient architectures that employ 
reconfigurability and enable adaptability would actively help the system avoid the 
degradation from the start. The contrast in system health management options, after the 
system is disturbed are summarized in Figure 12.  
 
 
Figure 12: Irreversible Response to Disturbance vs. Strategic Architecture Design 
 
Assuming that the dynamic behaviors of mission ability and system health degradation 
and recovery are similar to those of  
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Figure 10 to Figure 12, combined dynamic response ”trajectories” can be formed. Similar 
to scatter plots, where a point in XY space represents a particular design, a trajectory now 
represents a given system configuration under specified sets of mission expectations and 
external environmental conditions, as shown in the notional diagram of Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13: Trajectory Plots for System-Mission Performance 
 
As part of conceptual design, a Design of Experiments (DOE) can be defined and 
executed for the data generation and design space exploration. With a particular 
architecture as a baseline design, the environmental space can also be explored, for the 
investigating system resilience under combinations of external conditions and mission 
requirements. 
 
Figure 14: Trajectories for Various Reconfigurability Levels 
 
Reconfigurability effects are represented by the type of the trajectory. In a fashion similar 
to thermodynamic processes, an open loop, one-directional trajectory represents a non-
recoverable and irreversible response. A more reconfigurable system can be recoverable, 
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thus it can result in a bidirectional trajectory. The latter implies partial restoration of 
original system state, being equivalent to a non-close loop trajectory. Full recovery can 
be achieved when the steady state value meets the original state value, represented by a 
closed loop trajectory. More details on reconfigurability and recovery alternatives can be 
seen in Figure 14. 
 
The proposed set of metrics for resilience assessment 
To support system resilience assessment, there is a need for a systematic procedure that 
will allow for metric development. The starting point is the defining set of resilience 
characteristics of Figure 7 and it is required that metrics are associated to them. 
Resilience characteristics are mapped against the three types of system survivability: 
susceptibility, vulnerability and recoverability.  The development of metrics is based on 
the GQM approach (“Goal-Question-Metric”) that is suggested by INCOSE .  
 
Each characteristic can be assigned to a set of goals that then leads to certain research 
questions. The breakdown must be clear and straightforward, such that a complete answer 
can be given through a measure. The corresponding metric of this measure is then a 
candidate metric that could become part of the framework. Typically, there is a limited 
number of metric types and these can be classified as: 
 
• Ratio: Division of quantities, with the numerator and denominator being mutually 
exclusive. 
• Proportion: Division of quantities, with the numerator and denominator not being 
mutually exclusive and numerator is part of the denominator. 
• Percentage: Conversion of a proportion in terms of –per hundred- units. 
• Rate: Represents the dynamic rate of change of the phenomena of interest over 
time. 
 
In the following, the results of the GQM method are presented, along with discussion on 
the candidate metrics for supporting resilience assessment.  
 
Susceptibility reduction 
A resilient system must be capable of sensing and warning about incoming threats. 
Internal mechanisms should capture the presence of a threat, either passively through 
natural internal processes, or through intelligent detection technologies. Its prognostic 
capabilities must provide real time indications regarding threat location and direction of 
propagation for identification of its possible target. These requirements translate to the 
following functions: 
 
• Ability to monitor and sense threat 
• Ability to warn about threat 
• Ability to adapt to change 
 
 Ability to monitor and sense threat 
The two functions are the basis of system susceptibility. In a threat encounter 
susceptibility depends on three major factors: the threat, the system, and the mission 
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(Ball, 2003). According to the mission, the system is required to either monitor emerging 
threats within its environment, or sense whether the threat is targeting it or has already 
affected its operations. Traditional systems with sensors measure and estimate the impact 
of a threat, only after the system is affected and is experiencing change. For instance, a 
tire pressure monitoring system is using a piezoelectric sensor that can continuously 
monitor the pressure of a vehicle's tires. If a tire runs flat, it will also notify the 
passengers that pressure is low on this tire. However, the vehicle does not carry any 
sensing equipment that can monitor possible hazards on the road (e.g. detect metal 
objects that can harm the tire) and send warnings.  
 
To address this goal, one may ask what the percentage of threats, hazards and risks that 
can be monitored in a given range around the system is. The proposed metric would be 
detectability D and it is defined as the ratio of number of detected threats over the total 






ND =  (4) 
 
 
Similarly to human detecting abilities, threats can be detected either through their sight in 
a certain range or by the sound they make, namely the threat’s signature. Other detecting 
options can be the wavelength of a signal that is emitted by the threat, temperature 
increase due to heat flow rate from the threat or pressure difference due to disruptions to 
fluid flow rate.   
 
With prognostics having identified the approaching threat, diagnostics must identify 
affected subsystems and measure the ongoing "change". In particular, real time 
diagnostics must address how system's mission and health are affected,  
 
Utility functions U(t) describe system performance output could reflect ongoing system 
degradations. A generator’s power output, power delivery to a load, or heat flow rate on a 
heat exchanger, all are examples of utility functions that are suitable for diagnostics. For 
a given utility function U(t), degradation rate DR is the time derivative of performance 
value loss U(t) 
 
dt
dUtUDR −=−= )(  (5)  
Ability to warn about threat 
From the point that a threat is monitored up until the moment that it is sensed by the 
system, all appropriate actions to prepare minimize vulnerability must be taken, as the 
system experiences change. This warning time period depends on time required for 
sensor signals to be received by the central monitoring unit, with the slowest signal being 
critical.  A system could potentially be more resilient if this time is minimized and its   
Responsiveness RT approaches unity. Normalized with the minimum required time from 









= min  (6) 
 
 
Ability to adapt to change 
A distinguishing feature of resilient systems is the adaptability to changing conditions. 
Adaptability is implemented through increased reconfigurability in most cases and results 
in preventive measures for the anticipated changes. Adaptability could be evaluated with 
respect to time, namely how much time is needed to fully reconfigure for the change. 
Moreover, a second impact of adaptability is the shift of performance threshold value to 
reflect the system's accommodation to change. The threshold is a function of time t and 
the impact of the reconfiguration arec namely  
 
 ),( recthth atUU =′  (7) 
 
The reconfiguration itself is a function of a metric that describes the impact of the 
experienced change ΔVexog .   
 ),( exogrec Vtfa ∆=  (8) 
 
With clarified states and boundaries, it is necessary to monitor the system's transitions 
through the states according to the ongoing change. A possible measure of the threshold 
transitioning is the threshold availability AT , introduced by Richards (2009) and is given 
by equation (3).  
 
Vulnerability reduction 
System vulnerability assumes that the system has already been affected by the threat and 
all necessary actions to minimize losses and impede damage propagation are enabled. 
Robust design techniques, as well as vulnerability reduction technologies are the main 
factors for minimizing the penetration of change to the system’s normal operating 
conditions. In other words, robustness is partially implied through persistence to change 
or ability to absorb the change in case it is not mitigated. For vulnerability reduction, the 
system must be able to perform the following functions: 
 
• Ability to persist to change 
• Ability to absorb change 
 
Ability to persist to change 
In the context of increased ability to withstand to change, a resilient system adapts to 
changing conditions in advance compared to conventional systems. The goal is to 
increase the system's capacity of fighting against the change due to a threat and minimize 
adverse effects. To support this goal, the rate at which the system's performance is 
degrading must be identified and degradation rate DR is an applicable metric. The 
degradation time period Δtdeg is defined 
 
 0degmindeg ttt U −=∆  (9) 
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The degradation time period is the time elapsed from start of disturbance effects tdeg0 until 
the max performance degradation from normal performance conditions tUmin. For the 
same time period, the maximum performance degradation Umax is defined 
 
 min0degmax UUU −=∆  (10) 
 
as the maximum difference between original performance value U0 and U(t).  
 
Ability to absorb change 
Assuming that the change has a non-favorable effect on the system's performance and 
that the system has not suppressed the threat, it must be capable of becoming insensitive 
to the unavoidable change imposed by the effects of the threat. Different architectures 
have different ability of suppressing change. Degradation rate DR is a metric that allows 
for comparison of architectures. Design improvements on the architecture that would turn 
it to a more resilient system can be collectively represented by a multiplier ρ on the 




dUtUDR ρρ −=−= )(  (11) 
 
The effects of ρ can typically represent the effects of reconfigurability. The same effects 
can reduce the maximum degradation by β namely 
 
 β−∆=′∆ maxmax UU  (12) 
 
Given that performance degradation is a dynamic process, a cumulative estimation of the 
system performance can be provided by the time-weighted average system performance 
as described by equation (2). The time weighted average performance loss UL is given by 
equation (1). Combining UL and UT, a measure of the relative loss due to the threat 
effects can be expressed as a signal-to-noise ratio S/N, comparing the performance output 
U(t) over the time weighted average performance loss UL as a ratio. In a logarithmic scale 
 
 










UNSNS 1010log log10/log10/  (13) 
 
Recoverability 
Recoverability of a system includes all necessary procedures the system must employ to 
recover its health status and restore its mission performance ability. This translates to two 
responsibilities:  
 
• Ability to maintain subsystem connectivity and integrity 
• Ability to prevent system loss and fully recover the system's mission 
 
The first is a robustness feature, but the second is not something that a robust system 
would be able to do by default. Active reconfigurability and strategic decision making is 
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necessary for reallocating available resources properly to restore basic and mission 
related functions.  
 
Ability to maintain subsystem connectivity and integrity 
Vulnerability reduction can be expressed on a subsystem basis, or otherwise as a 
collective measure. Effects of reconfigurability are expected to maintain subsystem 
health status and the necessary connections among them, thus reducing the subsystem 
loss ratio SLR. This ratio is the number of damaged/inoperable subsystems over total 






SLR =  (14) 
 
 
System robustness is expected to have favorable effects on maintaining or restoring 
subsystem connections as part of overall recovery. Similarly, the connection loss ratio 
CLR is the ratio of the number of damaged/inoperable connections over total initial 






CLR =  (15) 
 
 
Ability to prevent system loss and fully recover the system's mission 
While robustness in some cases can contribute in maintaining system health, it does not 
necessarily have a favorable effect on mission ability restoration. Resilient systems are 
expected to restore a system’s mission ability close to a target value at an advanced 
recovery rate. The recovery rate RR at which system health/mission performance ability 
is restored is 
 
dt
dURR =  (16) 
 
namely the time derivative of the representative health or mission performance value for 
the recovery phase. The minimum time required trp to reach a restoration steady state is 
the time elapsed from the performance minimum tUmin up to tSS recovery 
 
 minUssrp ttt −=∆  (17) 
 
However, the system might not be fully restored to its original value U0. The restoration 
point offset from the original is: 
 
 0UUU dssrec −=∆  (18) 
 
As the system returns a USS value, a final assessment on the system's status requires the 
comparison to the thresholds at that time point. Remember that thresholds are in general 
dynamic, thus depending on system reconfigurability and aging.  
 





 rprt ttt ∆−∆=∆ deg  (19) 
System level Assessment  
The derived set of metrics is expected to support the complete analysis method that is 
forming the basis for system resilience assessment.  On the next level, the performance 
responses, along with their target values are combined into overall evaluation criteria 
(OEC), for constructing collective metrics for resilience. 
 
A state-of practice method to work as template for method development is the Total Ship 
Survivability Assessment Method (TSSA) . Despite the fact that it refers to ship systems, 
a generalized version of the TSSA can be augmented to support for resilience assessment 
for any system. Given the natural association of the concept of resilience to mission 
uncertainty, this would be a probabilistic implementation.  
 
Metrics are hierarchically distributed, with the system parameters as the lower level there 
are the subsystem metrics. The next level includes the measures of performance, or the 
MOPs that involve conditional probability calculations based upon the values of the SPs. 
At the higher level, the measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are the aggregate metrics for 
high level mission and system survival assessment. 
 
 
Calculation of the conditional probabilities for each event outcome is necessary for the 
MOE aggregate metric estimation that will eventually return the total probabilities of 
mission PS(Mission) and system PS(System)  survival. According to Ball’s classic 
survivability formulation 
 KS PP −= 1  (20) 
 
where, PS is the probability of survival and PK is the killability or probability of not 
surviving the disturbance. Depending on the type of the disturbance, if this happens to be 
an attack initiated by an external entity, the equation can become: 
 
 HKHS PPP /1−=  (21) 
 
where PH is the probability of being detected, also known as susceptibility and  PK/H is the 
probability of not surviving the attack hit and get killed after being detected, namely 
system vulnerability. It is interesting to observe that vulnerability is a conditional 
probability that depends on the outcome of a threat, while susceptibility is a probability 
that solely depends on whether the threat was encountered or avoided. 
 
The complete mission must generate a scenario that is broken down into epochs and 
actions. The latter can be accomplished through an event tree breakdown (or a ”kill 
chain” according to military engineers), where the entire incident is broken down into 
subsequent time epochs. The scenario will help define the survivability equation. 
Susceptibility, vulnerability and recoverability appear as aggregates of the resilience 
metrics that have been outlined in the previous section. Multiple runs of the same 
scenario (e.g. in the form of a Monte Carlo simulation) allow for probabilistic estimates 
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for the survivability components from resilience metrics and then give an overall picture 
of how the system performs for this scenario.  
 
A simple canonical problem 
In order to demonstrate the goodness of the proposed metrics, a simple pilot problem has 
been constructed. It is computational model of a loaded elastic/plastic cantilever. Its 
mission is to support a uniform load distribution, however an external load distribution 
applies on the beam unexpectedly, thus increasing its deflection and bring it on its 
structural limits.  Given that the concept of resilience has a wide application for materials, 
with elasticity and plasticity thresholds to play the same role as the system performance 
threshold, an analogy has been drawn between the controlled cantilever beam to a 
complex system architecture that may experience unexpected damage that propagates 




Figure 15: Philosophical Analogy between the Elastic Plastic Beam and A System 
Architecture Experiencing Damage Propagation 
 
The demonstration model involves a cantilevered beam that can experience time varying 
continuous forces through a weight distribution F = w(x,t). As a result of this input 
stimulus, the beam is experiencing a deflection from its original horizontal equilibrium 
position, along with a certain amount of curvature that changes its shape. The strain that 
the beam is experiencing and determines the deflection and the curvature are immediate 
functions of the beam’s shape, material and the effect of any actuator control system that 
may be included in the experimental setup. The experimental setup is described by Figure 
16. 
 
The computational model is a combination of elementary models for either elastic or 
transient plastic responses. According to the instantaneous value of the bending moment 
at each beam element, the corresponding moment is “activated” and used for the 
deflection and deflection rate calculations. The more elements behaving as a rigid plastic 
body, the greater is the propagation of plasticity.  Damage propagation on this system is 






Figure 16: Simple beam model for testing the proposed resilience assessment 
framework 
 
A feedback controller is included to “model” robustness to external unexpected effects. 
Spring and damper elements included, represent secondary subsystems that the beam as 
the main center system needs to interact with. 
 
Type  State  Mission  Health  
Elastic 
Behavior  
OK  Carry 100% of w(x) 
No disturbance in 
mission  
Deflection only due to w(x) 
Bending moment is M<My  
 everywhere 





Carry at least 95% of w(x) 
Disturbance is withstood 
Mission recovers  
Deflection is due to w and external loading 
δmax<=0.2L 
Bending moment is M<My  
everywhere 






Carry at least 95% of w 
Partial or no mission full 
recovery  
Deflection may exceed 0.2L  
Bending moment becomes M>M0  
at some beam regions 
Plastic hinges form until beam becomes 





Carry the minimum of w 
Beam breaks  
Deflection infinite 
Rigid plastic beam until it  fractures  
 
Figure 17: Beam System States with Mission and System Requirements 
 
In Figure 17, the detail description of system and mission states is included. Technical 
parameters for the beam configuration are presented in Table 1.  
 
Technical results at this stage are provided by a JMP analysis environment, based on 
performance response from the aforementioned canonical problem.  At this point, the 
environment contains the basic necessary functionality, yet its development is not 
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finalized, as more data visualizations are included. The ultimate goal is to develop an 
analysis and visualization tool that will be the backbone of the resilience assessment 
method. Screenshots of the JMP-based tool are shown in Figure 18. 
 
 
Table 1: Baseline Configuration Parameters for the Cantilever Beam 
 
Beam Parameters  
Width b  16.3 e-3 m  
Depth  H  4.5e-3 m  
Length  L  0.356 m  
Density ρ  7850 kgr/m3  
Yield Stress  σY  200e6 N/m2  
Young’s Modulus  E  207e9 N/m2  
Max Elastic bending moment  M0 = bh2σY/4  16.5 N-m  
Control System  
Spring constant k 500  
Damping coefficient b 25  










The computational simulation model was based on the elastic/plastic cantilever beam 
model by Parkes (1955), including enhancements suggested by Symonds & Fleming 
(1984). With the first version being inadequate to capture the elastic transition to 
plasticity, a second version has been developed in Simulink. This version retains the 
hierarchy of sub-models of the original version, but more effective and accurate 
theoretical models are implemented for the elastic (Hodges & Pierce) and plastic (Jones) 
phases.  In this enhanced version, the simulation keeps track of vital responses for each 
beam element. These responses include local deflection, deflection rate and bending 
moment. Figure 19 presents screenshots of dynamic responses for the beam deflection 


















Figure 19: Screenshots of Beam Deflection and Bending Moment Time Histories for 
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The disturbance input for this set of experiments is of sinusoidal shape with respect to 
time and it is linearly distributed over the length of the beam. For small magnitudes of 
disturbance the beam maintains its oscillatory motion, while it absorbs the energy due to 
the work that the external load produces. It also successfully maintains its integrity and 
does not deform plastically. The detailed behavior of the beam over its length x and over 
time t is shown in the 3-D plots of Figure 20.  
 
 
Figure 21: Time-Based Phase Distribution for Small Disturbances 
 
 
Part of the experiment is to keep track of the portion of total simulation time that the 
system remains on a certain phase. These phases are the elastic, non-linear elastic and 
plastic behavior phases. To comply with the system analogy, these phases would 
correspond to system states, similar to these discussed in Figure 17.  On the contrary, for 
larger disturbances, the behavior is different. As one can see in Figure 22, most of the 
simulation time finds the system in the nonlinear elastic phase and eventually turns fully 
plastic for a short period of time until it ultimately collapses. System behavior in space 
and time is shown in Figure 23.  
 


























Total simulation time distribution
 























Beam deflection w(x,t) (m)






















Beam deflection rate dw(x,t)/dt (m/sec)


























Beam Length, x (m)
Beam bending moment M(x,t) (N-m)
Time, t (sec)
Beam deflectionBeam deflection rate
Bending moment
 
Figure 23: Beam Simulation Responses for a Disturbance Of Large Magnitude 
 
One of the benefits of this particular implementation is that “propagation” of plasticity 
over the beam until collapse is thoroughly modeled in the Simulink simulation. That 
allows for incorporating damage propagation analysis within the framework. As an 
example, damage propagation can be described in 2-d diagrams of system locations that 
experience damage over the full simulation time span. The diagram of Figure 24 shows 
the rate at which plasticity moves from the beam root towards the tip. At the beginning of 
the simulation, plasticity rate is high but it gradually slows down as more beam elements 
reach the fully plastic moment threshold. Eventually, plasticity has spread throughout the 
entire beam and the beam collapses at a certain element.   
 


































As part of the ongoing efforts to complete the resilience assessment framework, DOE 
cases are constructed and are used as inputs to the beam simulation for generating data. 
The data is the pilot for ensuring that the metrics presented earlier are the appropriate 
ones and sensitivities due to environmental changes and configuration variation are 
captured. Furthermore, all parts of the process will be compiled to a method with certain 
steps and experimental outcomes for further analysis. As an example, the cases shown in 
Table 2 were considered:  
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Case 1  4  14000  0.1  0  45  40  
Case 2  6  8000  0.2  0  0  20  
Case 3  6  4000  0.2  0  0  0  
Case 4  4  12000  0.1  0  0  40  
Case 5  2  10000  0.1  0  15  60  
Case 6  6  10000  0.2  0  30  40  
 
Time duration distributions for each dynamic phase are summarized in Figure 25 and 
similarly the damage propagation plots were obtained, as shown in Figure 26. In order 
however, to conduct a full resilience assessment, a larger number of cases-scenarios need 
to be constructed and simulated. The method must be probabilistic in order to capture the 
uncertainty around when and how disturbances occur.  Part of the ongoing research thus 
is to explore options on linking the lower level deterministic measures to probabilistic 










































Case 6Case 4  
Figure 26: Plasticity (Damage) “Propagation” Over Time for Six Experimental 
Cases 
 
Given that the resilience assessment tool is not intended only for analysis, but also in 
support for conceptual  design and decision making, a series of visual aids is considered 
for allowing the down selection of possible design configurations, is resilience and 
survivability are the design objectives.  As an example of such aid, are the mission-health 
trajectories that describe how the system dynamically evolves towards states that imply 
either degraded health or performance ability. A link of such instrument to overall 




Figure 27:  Trajectory Plot Based On Six Beam Simulation Cases 
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1.3.2. Framework Demonstration for Resilience Assessment of Naval 
Systems (Subtask 1.2) 
 
For this subtask, the purpose is to use the resilience assessment tool, as this is being 
developed on the cantilever beam, on naval ship systems architecture. It has been a 
challenging venture to identify and formulate o suitable modeling and simulation 
environment for this purpose. Up to this point, a simulation environment for a YP-679 
ship model is under development in order to be used as a demonstration enabler for the 
resilience assessment framework. Regarding the development of the framework, further 
work is required on processing of the metrics and mapping lower level metrics to 
probabilistic MOEs.  
 
Regarding the application of the resilience assessment framework in a naval system 
related problem, the plan is to combine individual models of engineering subsystems to 
produce integrated models for dynamic simulation. The most significant part of this 
particular effort will be a routine that models and investigates damage propagation on a 
naval system. The damage model engine will analyze (damage prediction) and visualize 
(on the Paramarine ship model) the damage propagation throughout the particular 
architecture. In this task, a total ship systems operations M&S environment is the desired 
outcome, including an investigation of damage generation and propagation.  
1.4. Conclusions and Future Work 
For the remainder of the resilience assessment tool development, the method must be 
vertically integrated to survivability measures, as well as to provide overall system 
effectiveness measures. Another possible addition is a cost effectiveness analysis module, 
through which the designer is allowed to test and evaluate possible architecture 
enhancements or technology infusion. The latter appears to fit better into the ship 
demonstration example, given that cost estimates are more accessible and meaningful. In 
the end,  it is expected that while resilient systems should be more mission capable and 
survivable, this would not come at no cost and thus a cost effectiveness study would offer 
more insight as to whether the concepts of resilience engineering should become the 
paradigm for more safe and survivable designs.  
Task 2: Integration of Heterogeneous Systems 
2.1 Introduction 
The new generation of Navy ships will be all-electric, fully integrated, and will be 
comprised of several main subsystems, such as electrical, hydraulic, and control systems. 
It would be too expensive and time-consuming to test-build these systems and integrate 
them as hardware. Also, it would be impossible to test such physical systems under real 
conditions, especially when they are to be operated under war scenarios. Thus, computer 
models will be used to simulate the integration and investigate their behaviors. The sub-
systems are represented by dynamic system computer models that accurately represent 
the actual physical systems. An integration environment links the sub-system models into 
a single dynamic model that accurately represents the real world. The system co-
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simulation is performed using the time-discrete method to make sure the right models get 
the right data at right time. In this study, the sub-models are executed in small and equal 
system time steps. After their execution, they exchange their output values among each 
other. The selection of this system time step is of critical importance, since it determines 
the accuracy of the simulation results and the computational expense that needs to be 
provided. This report presents the research that has been undertaken with respect to the 
time stepping of co-simulation where the equations for the integrated sub-systems are 
unknown. A discussion of the three previously proposed subtasks is included. 
2.2 General model setup 
The next generation Navy ship follows a new design paradigm, shifting towards an all-
electric and fully integrated system. A key enabler for this paradigm shift is the accurate 
and timely modeling and co-simulation of the implemented sub-systems. For this, an 
integrated modeling and simulation framework is developed, which will integrate 
different models of physical dynamic systems into an overall model that accurately 
represents the integrated real system. 
 
The new ship systems to be integrated into the model are more complex and complicated 
than previous generations of systems, and their development is becoming more costly and 
time-consuming. Therefore, modeling and simulation (M&S) becomes an imperative part 
of the system development process, since it enables the designer to integrate the models 
of the developed system, which in turn allows system investigation and error 
determination before an actual physical system is produced. This results in greatly 
reduced time and cost efforts necessary during the design process. Therefore, it becomes 
increasingly important to develop accurate modeling and simulation tools that help to 
enable sophisticated and accurate M&S tasks. 
 
Even though modern computers provide unsurpassed calculating power, simulation 
models become more and more complex at the same time. Furthermore, the modeling 
paradigm shifts towards a distributed simulation of integrated sub-models. Some reasons 
for this are use of legacy codes, distributed computing, and interdisciplinary modeling. 
All these lead to co-simulation of dynamic systems as a means of interconnecting 
different dynamic sub-models into an overall integrated model. It is desirable to find 
ways in which the computational expense for such complex simulations can be reduced 
without sacrificing accuracy. Ideally, this approach will also provide some sort of error 
control, so as to be able to see how the simulation results vary as options for saving 
computational expenses are applied. 
2.2.1 Co-Simulation Principles 
The common approach of integrating the underlying continuous dynamic systems is by 
implementing a discrete time step simulation. Commonly used computers are digital, and 
hence cannot process data in infinitely small steps. Therefore, any simulation will have to 
be discretized, either in time or in state. The most common approach to simulating 
continuous systems on digital computers is to execute the digital model at discrete times, 
employing finite time steps. For one single model, it generally consists of a “global” 
system time step which determines the overall system time frame in which the model 
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behavior is to be simulated. This time step is henceforth denoted as ∆T. In order for the 
simulation to obtain the results after the global time step ∆T, the simulation will start to 
process the model with the given initial conditions. However, within the time frame from 
the initial to the final time, the simulation can employ one or several sub-steps to reach 
the end of the simulation. This “local” time step ∆t can be as large as the global step ∆T 
(this represents an upper limit), or smaller, thus splitting up the execution step into 
smaller sub steps. Figure 28 depicts the time step scheme. 
 
Figure 28: Model Time Stepping Schematic 
 
One challenge for a continuous system simulation is to choose an optimal trade-off 
between local and global time step size. If the global time step covers a long system time, 
a simulation in one time step will result in very inaccurate results. Hence, the local time 
step ∆t will have to be chosen smaller than the global step ∆T. The smaller ∆t gets, the 
more accurate the simulation becomes in theory. However, this comes with some 
disadvantages. Firstly, reducing the local step size will increase the number of times the 
simulation has to calculate the model, thus increasing the required computational expense 
and real-world time requirement. Secondly, the smaller the simulation time step becomes, 
the larger the calculation errors become due to the limited accuracy that a digital 
computer has to represent numbers. The calculation errors will sum up over the run of the 
simulation, and eventually the result will become too inaccurate to use, or the simulation 
itself will cease to work due to these errors. It is therefore clear that the time step used 
must be traded off between fastest execution and highest accuracy. As a result, an optimal 
time step setting must be found. This setting will depend on the underlying model’s 
dynamic properties. 
 
When co-simulating several dynamic sub-models to represent an overall dynamic system, 
the different dynamic behaviors of the sub-systems need to be accounted for. It must be 
made sure that all systems start at the same simulation time, and with initial conditions 
referring to that time, and end after the same time step. Only then can the sub-systems 
exchange their output states with the other systems. Figure 29 shows the execution 
schedule for such a model. 
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In this setup, it is assumed that the sub-models are distributed over different computers, 
and are executed in parallel. Once all sub-models have reached the end of one calculation 
step ∆T, execution is halted, and results are exchanged between the models. 
 
The timing of the sub-model execution, and the data exchange between them, is the task 
of a scheduler, which is the main component of a co-simulation environment. The 
scheduler is responsible to make sure that the simulation runs the sub-models from a 
common starting time to a common end time. The scheduler also exchanges the data 
between the models after each time step, and makes sure that each model gets only those 
outputs as new inputs which it actually requires. The scheduler also enforces any 
constraints between the sub-models, saves the required responses into a database, and 
ensures data consistency. The scheduler is usually written using programming languages 
(e.g. C/C++, Java) or scripting languages (e.g. VBScript in ModelCenter®). This offers 
more flexibility in the design of the scheduler, and speed in the execution of the 
simulation, but also requires a thorough program design. 
 
The scheduler saves all sub-system responses after every time step. Data is taken from 
here for every data update the scheduler issues. The saved data can be used to visualize 
and monitor the different states and responses. Using a database for this task reduces 
computational expense since the data does not have to be recreated through co-simulation 
execution. 
 
The sub models used in a co-simulation are treated as “Black Boxes”. They are assumed 
to be provided by third party contributors. Hence, their internals are confidential and 
cannot be changed. The only information these models require are its state inputs at the 
beginning of each simulation time step, and the only information obtainable from these 
models is the state information at the end of each simulation time step. It follows that the 
co-simulation environment needs only to handle these variables. 
 
The local time step, referred to as ∆t in Figure 29, is the time step used by the sub 
model’s solver for the numerical integration. The local time step does not necessarily 
have to be fixed for all sub-models, neither does it have to be fixed within each sub-
model. ∆t affects the solution stability of the individual sub models during co-simulation. 
 
The sub-models run for a system time ∆T, after which they stop execution and exchange 
their variables. This time step must be greater or equal to ∆t. ∆T affects the stability of 
the sub-model, but also the accuracy of the results of the co-simulation. Basic 
information on modeling and simulation can be found in [Zeigler, Kim and Praehofer 
2000]. 
2.2.2 Double pendulum: a simple example 
In order to be able to evaluate co-simulation principles, specifically an adaptive time 
stepping algorithm using a simple model of a 2D double pendulum was created. This 
model is well-understood and widely referenced. A double pendulum is a system of two 
pendulums that are tightly coupled. One pendulum bar is attached to a fixed point, and 
the second bar is attached to the lower end of the first bar at the first bar’s mass point. 
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The overall system’s dynamic behavior depends on the two masses, the lengths of the 
two bars, and the initial conditions. The bars are assumed mass-less, and no friction is 









Figure 30: Double pendulum schematic 
 
The system equations describing a double pendulum are a set of two second order 
nonlinear differential equations, each corresponding to one of the masses. A monolithic 
computer model of the whole system (representing the two nonlinear equations) was 
created using Matlab/Simulink©. A block diagram of the Simulink® model is shown in 
Figure 31. For later examinations, this model is used as the reference to determine the 






















































Figure 31: Simulink Model of Double endulum 
 
The monolithic model was split into two sub-models, each of which represents one of the 
two pendulum bars. Hence, it could be used as the basis to which the co-simulation was 
compared. Initial runs were made to determine the overall system behavior, and analysis 
can be done about how the time step ∆T influences the results. 
 
Co-simulation adds another level of complexity to the overall time step problem. In order 
to create a simple model with which the time step variation algorithm could be developed 
and tested, the monolithic model of the double pendulum in Figure 31 was split up into 
its two subsystems, each representing one of the pendulum bars. These two sub-models 
were then integrated into a simple co-simulation model using a Matlab® script. The 
script is responsible for calling the sub-models, synchronizing the data exchange between 
them, and adjusting the time step. Using this script, trade studies were performed to 
evaluate variable time step algorithms and their effect on simulation execution speed and 
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accuracy. The investigations were made on the lower pendulum subsystem. Figure 32 
shows a schematic of the split model. 
 
Figure 32: Split Pendulum Execution Schematic 
 
In order to co-simulate the split model, it must be ensured that all models start and end at 
the same global simulation times. Hence, for all models, ∆T must be the same, and the 
co-simulation must start at the same system time for all sub-models. It must though, also 
be ensured that all models do the same number of sub-steps ∆t in this period. For the 
scope of this research, global and local time steps are kept equal at all times. The task 
then becomes to find a time step ∆T that provides the best compromise between 
execution time and deviation error. 
 
Initially, a time step can be chosen according to several aspects, such as experience, 
results from single component simulations, system frequencies, etc. A minimum step size 
should be defined, which represents a lower bound due to system natural frequencies, and 
will not be exceeded by the variable time step algorithm. 
 
Intuitively, the second derivative (rate of change of the slope) of state variables could be 
employed to determine when to increase and decrease the time step. In areas with large 
second derivative, the time step should be small, in areas with low second derivative, the 
time step can be increased again. A first attempt to reduce the calculation expense is 
therefore to reduce the time step in the sections with high rate of change of the slope to 
become more accurate there. Then, when the rate of change of the slope becomes low 
again, the time step can be increased again. Such an approach was presented, e.g. in 
[Crouzet and Turinsky, 1996], and [Joukhadar and Laugier, 1996], and [Nairouz et al., 
2009]. However, the approach in [Nairouz et al., 2009] was comparatively simple, as it 
was related to the specific model used, and did not provide a general approach towards 
the time stepping issue. Furthermore, it did not provide any means of error control. The 
resulting time steps were thus arbitrary in a sense that they could not be used in any other 
application, and did not give any information as to how far “off” the result was when the 
time step was varied, compared to a simulation with a very small fixed time step (which 
in turn would valid the assumption of correct results). Therefore, another approach 
needed to be found to provide a generally applicable algorithm for setting the co-
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2.2.3 Description of numerical method for time step control of 
monolithic dynamic systems with known equations 
The approach selected here for further investigation is taken from the numerical solution 
of ordinary differential equations (ODEs). In the very general case, dynamic systems are 
represented by ODEs. ODEs are equations of the form 
 
 ),,(' tuyfy =  (22) 
This means that the derivative (= slope) of the underlying (generally unknown) base 
function is defined and computed through an equation that uses the current state y, an 
external input u, and the current system time t. These ODEs are used to model the 
dynamic systems in a computer. Given real time, these equations perfectly describe the 
dynamics of the modeled system. However, often such an equation cannot be solved, and 
hence the underlying base function needs to be approximated. Commonly this is done 
using digital computers. However, when using digital computers, the equation can only 
be solved stepwise in time since digital computers do not have infinite time resolution. 
This introduces an error to the approximation. The task therefore is to approximate the 
unknown underlying base function through a series of system time steps whose size must 
be determined in order to keep this error as low as possible, or within a prescribed range. 
Note that in the discussion for this report, the external input u is not considered. Also note 
that from here on out, the terms “slope” and “derivative” are used interchangeably. 
 





time t: (t, y)
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Figure 33: Euler’s Method 
 
The very first and easiest approach to do this is using Euler’s approach. Euler’s approach 
takes the current position and time, and calculates a future point based on the resulting 
slope and given time step. With the slope y’ of the current point y, and the prescribed 
time step h (here, the time step is denoted h instead of ∆T or ∆t to distinguish its 
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generality from the previous special case discussions), the next point is calculated using 
the equation 
 
 '* yhyy currentnew +=  (23)  
See Figure 33 for explanation. 
 
It can be readily observed that such an approach produces comparatively high errors. This 
is because it only takes into account the situation at the current point in time. If the slope 
of the underlying base function changes over the next time period with length h, then an 
error is introduced and it is in the order of magnitude of the time step h, 
 )(hO∝ε  (24)  
There are two methods to reduce this error. The first one is to take some points in the 
future, calculate the slope there, and then apply a corrected slope at the current time step. 
This is depicted in Figure 34. 
t t + ∆t
∆t/2 = h/2
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time t + ∆t/2:





Figure 34: Corrected Slope Approach (Heun’s method) 
 
In this example, the slope at the next point in the future is used together with the slope at 
the current time step to calculate an average slope. This average slope is then used as the 
slope for the calculation for the next step. This approach is the second order Euler 
approach, also known as Heun’s method. It can be seen that this method already 
represents a great improvement over the basic Euler method. The method can also be 
extended to go beyond just a single point in the future. By using more and more such 
points, the current slope can be approximated more and more precisely. It is clear that 
such an approach also increased the computational expense since the slope must be 
calculated at all the future points for each time step. A commonly used approach is to use 
four additional slopes for the algorithm, referred to as Runge-Kutta fourth-order method 
(RK4). It requires five function evaluations per time step, one for the current point and 
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four for the four future points. For an n-step Runge-Kutta method, the error is 
proportional to the time step taken to the power of n, 
 )( nhO∝ε  (25)  
The second method to reduce the error through the underlying base function 
approximation is clearly visible in Figure 33. The error will be reduced if the time step is 
reduced. Since the error is proportional to the time step, a reduction in time step by 50% 
will in general reduce the error by 50% as well. If this approach is used together with the 
slope approximation described above, the error can further be reduced. However, it must 
be kept in mind that reducing the time step will result in more points along the underlying 
base function to be calculated. So for both the described methods it holds that the 
decreased error comes along with an increased computational expense. It must also be 
noted that, while the above approaches do reduce the error, they do not provide for an 
error estimation or approximation. It can be seen that for different rates of change of the 
slopes, the error will be different. Hence, any method that future points at fixed time steps, 
and in general any method that uses fixed time steps, will not be useful for actually 
controlling the error. This can only be achieved through variable adaptive time steps. 
 
Various such methods have been developed over the last decades, the most famous ones 
being of the Adams- and the Runge-Kutta-Fehlberg families. For this report and research, 
the Runge-Kutta-Fehlberg family of algorithms has been chosen. These algorithms were 
developed by Fehlberg [Fehlberg, 1969; and Fehlberg,1970] on the basis of the Runge-
Kutta algorithms described before. In general, these algorithms (like most other families 
of variable adaptive time step algorithms) are of the predictor-corrector type. They apply 
an nth-order predictive step first, similar to the RK4 algorithms discussed above. However, 
instead of using the result of this step to approximate the next point, an additional future 
point is used as a corrector to cross-check the result obtained from the nth-order step, thus 
rendering an (n+1)th-order method. Based on the difference between the nth-order and the 
(n+1)th-order output, the error is estimated. This error estimation can then be used to 
either proceed with the approximation if the error is below a prescribed threshold, or to 
reduce the time step and repeat the approach at the current time step. More details on 
these algorithms can be found in the general literature, e.g. in [Burden and Faires, 2002]. 
For the method described in this report and research, the Runge-Kutta-Fehlberg-2-3 
predictor-corrector (RKF23) method is employed. It creates a second order prediction and 
a third order correction, and was deemed a good compromise between accuracy and 
computational expense. The RKF23 algorithm is notionally described as follows 
(algorithm from [Ascher and Petzold, 1998]): 
 
 User input: 
 - starting system state y = current system state 
 - starting time step h = current time step 
 - prescribed error tolerance τ 
 - defined maximum time step hmax 





 let T = 0 
 run until T >= Tfinal 
  calculate state y and slope y’=k1 at current time step 
  calculate slopes k2 and k3 at future points T+h/2 and T+h, respectively 
  let y2 = y + h * k2 
  let y3 = y + h * (1/6*k1 + 4/6* k2 + 1/6* k3) 
  let error γ = y3 – y2 
  if γ <= τ then 
   let ynew = y3 
   let T = T + h 
  set new time step h = min(hmax, 0.8*h*( τ / γ)0.25 
 end 
 
Oftentimes, the dynamic model does not consist of only one single ODE, but rather of 
several ODEs that form a system of ODEs which describes the underlying system. The 
above algorithms can be adjusted to solve such system of ODEs, where each sub-system 
has its own time stepping approach, all systems are solved in parallel by one single solver. 
Applicable solvers for systems of ODEs have been developed for a long time, and are 
published in the general literature about dynamic simulation and numerical integration, 
see e.g. [Burden and Faires, 2002]. These algorithms have been continuously improved 
and modified for special cases [Mehrkanoon et al., 2009; and Savcenco and Mattheij, 
2010]. In general, these solvers will take the different parts of the dynamic system, solve 
each one with its own variable adaptive time step, and synchronize the results at the end 
of the simulation time. 
 
Solving a system of ODEs is a very similar problem to the co-simulation of dynamic 
systems. In essence, it is a method to approximate an unknown underlying base function. 
Both the underlying function for the ODE, and the underlying path of a state variable in a 
co-simulation, are unknown functions that need to be approximated. While the system of 
ODEs is generally solved by only one solver, in a co-simulation each sub-model has its 
own solver. Nevertheless, the models must be integrated and synchronized, just like in a 
system of ODEs. As described above, every sub-model has its own internal variable 
adaptive time step ∆t. The simulation is carried out for every sub-model over a global 
time step ∆T, after which the co-simulation is stopped, and the data is exchanged between 
the sub-models. Since the sub-models each have their own solver, whose internals usually 
can neither be observed nor changed, it must be assumed that the sub-models are 
executed with an internal time step ∆t that is optimal as the solver sees it fit. Therefore, 
the initially proposed examination of internal vs. external time step is not relevant for the 
problem of co-simulation of different sub-systems. First, it can be assumed that the local 
time step ∆t is chosen by each solver optimally for each time step. In the research 
proposed here, a different approach is chosen. Instead of using an internal time step ∆t 
that is chosen by the solver, the internal time step ∆t is set to be equal to the global time 
step ∆T. This means that after every time step ∆T, when the simulation is halted and the 
data are exchanged, and each sub-model has itself be solved over only one single time 
step. This need not be the case in every co-simulation, since as discussed above it is 
oftentimes not possible to impose such a constraint on the solver of each sub-model. But 
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it must be kept in mind that this is not relevant to the execution of the co-simulation itself. 
The described approach then leaves the global time step ∆T as the time step to be varied 
and adapted to control the error of the co-simulation. 
 
Due to the similarity of the problem, it is tempting to now claim that the techniques for 
the solution of a system of ODEs can be directly applied to a co-simulation environment. 
This would in theory be true if the system equations of the sub-systems were known. In 
particular, the slope of the state variables would have to be delivered as an output of the 
sub-models. However, this is oftentimes not the case. If for example precompiled legacy 
codes are used for sub-models, they may not give the derivatives of the state variables 
(i.e., the state variable slopes) as outputs. The same situation can arise if third party 
proprietary models are used. Even if the models are created by an in-house engineer 
using commercial simulation software, the outputs of the state variable slopes may not be 
available. For example, in the co-simulation environment created for the IRIS project, the 
fluid system was created with the commercial software Flowmaster. While the flow 
model was created by an in-house engineer, and thus its internals are known and 
understood, the software nevertheless does not provide state derivative outputs. In order 
to use the proven time step setting methods described above, the slope must therefore be 
acquired and approximated by some means before such algorithms can be applied. 
2.2.4 Application of the adaptive time step method to the double 
pendulum sample problem 
The split and integrated double pendulum model that was described in detail above is 
used to implement the proposed RKF23 into a co-simulation environment with 
“unknown” models and without the state derivatives available (this is not theoretically 
correct, however, since the state derivatives indeed are readily available from the sub-
models; they are however, assumed to be unknown, and used only for evaluation). As 
mentioned, the sub-model local time steps ∆t are equal to the global time simulation time 
step ∆T, at each of which the simulation stops and exchanges variables. 
 
The main problem in this setup, and in the research proposed here, is that the state 
derivatives (the slopes) are unknown. In order to be able to implement the proven time 
stepping algorithms from numerical simulation, these derivatives must be acquired using 
the available state data information. In general, this might turn out to be an involved 
process. This falls into the area of scattered data approximation, which has been 
discussed in many publications, for example in [Wendland, 2005]. In the double 
pendulum model, this is achieved by using the current point, the previous two points, and 
the future steps at T+h/2 and T+h (see notional algorithm listing above) to construct a 
four-point third-order polynomial, whose derivatives are then taken at the current and 
future points. The initial use of a second-order three-point polynomial has proven to not 
work with the RKF23 algorithm, because due to its nature, the second derivative for such 
a polynomial is equal at all three points. From the notional algorithm listing above it can 
be seen that such behavior leads to a predictor-corrector error γ that is zero at all times. 
Hence, the algorithm sees no reason to change the time step, and it will use the same 
initial time step during the whole simulation run. The four-point polynomial is 
constructed using the approach described in [Vanderplaats, 2005]. The values of y, y2, 
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and y3 in the above algorithm are obtained by running the simulation over the necessary 
time ranges h/2 and h, starting from the current position. 
 
Figure 35 depicts the result for the upper pendulum bar of the double pendulum. 


















Θu variable time step
Θu fixed time step
 
Figure 35: Double Pendulum Simulation Result, Upper Pendulum Deflection Angle 
 
The red curve shows the actual pendulum deflection angle Θ1 when the time step is fixed 
and very small. The blue line shows the result for the applied time stepping algorithm. In 
general, the agreement between the curves is acceptable. However, especially in the 
regions where the rate of change of the slope is high, the time stepping algorithm tends to 
overshoot the ideal result. 
 
Figure 36 shows how the time stepping algorithm varied the time step over the run time 
of the simulation. 
 
It can be observed that there are regions of strong fluctuations where the derivatives reach 
their maximum and minimum. The reason for this behavior is as of now not understood 
and subject to intense research. The result of this behavior is that due to these fluctuations, 
the deviation error γ (as per notional algorithm description) in these regions becomes very 
high, resulting in repeated simulation runs and very small time steps where it is not 
necessary. This behavior furthermore impacts the simulation result at the turning points 
of the pendulum deflection angle graph. Here, the time step should ideally be lower but is 
negatively impacted by the behavior of the calculated slopes. In order to compare the 
calculated slopes with the “correct” slopes available from the sub-models themselves, the  
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Figure 36: Time Step Settings of Double Pendulum Simulation 
 
deviations of these slopes were calculated. See Figure 38 for a comparison. It can be 
observed that there is strong chattering in the deviations, indicating that the calculated 
slopes deviate from the “correct” slopes strongly and with large variability in certain 
regions. These variations directly impact the results of the time stepping algorithm, 
rendering it much less effective as it should in theory be. Hence, there needs to be further 
investigation into why this chattering happens, and what measure can be taken in order to 
reduce or completely avoid the fluctuations. An investigation into the stability of the 
simulation against randomly set time steps that are not a function of the current slope has 
shown that the simulation is very resistant against time step fluctuations themselves. This 
indicates that the implementation of the time stepping algorithm itself incurs some 
behavior into the simulation that leads to the chattering of the slopes and the subsequent 
time stepping behavior. A preliminary analysis indicates that it might be the time step 
itself that leads to the deviations. If the time step is very small, even slight deviations of 
the state variables lead to large changes in state derivatives between two subsequent time 
steps. Since a simulation is never as smooth as an ODE, this might be the cause of the 
strong derivative variations. If this is the cause, then a possible remedy could be to use 
curve smoothing, or to implement a minimum time step in order to decrease the possible 
magnitude of the derivative jumps. 
 
Figure 37 shows the calculated state derivatives (slopes) k1, k2, and k3 over the length of 
the simulation run. 
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Figure 37: Slopes k1, k2, and k3 for Double Pendulum Simulation 
 
 







































Figure 38: Deviations of Calculated and “Correct” Slopes 
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2.3 Discussion of approach with respect to proposed subtasks 
In the previous report, three subtasks have been proposed: 
 
1. Determination of real-world representation of co-simulated system 
2. Definition of optimal ratio between global and local time steps 
3. Definition of corrective actions for accurate co-simulation execution 
 
Subtasks 1 and 3 are handled through the application of a proven algorithm from the 
numerical integration of ODEs. The conditions for these algorithms are clear and known. 
The algorithms themselves are mathematically proven and rigorous. They are employed 
to approximate an unknown underlying function, or “path” that a variable has to take. 
The underlying problem is the same for both applications “solving an ODE” and 
“obtaining the path of a co-simulation state variable”. Therefore, the application of such 
an algorithm to a co-simulation handles the issues in subtasks 1 and 3, provided that the 
simulation itself is set up properly (which is an underlying assumption in this research, 
and a given condition for the double pendulum model used). 
 
Subtask 2 is itself not an issue for research. It has been discussed above, that the 
application of an “optimal” ratio between local and global time steps is not critical to the 
execution of the co-simulation. In the case where the sub-model solver is unknown, this 
solver will choose an internal time step that it deems “optimal” to solve the model within 
the given global time step. Its internal local time step is neither controllable nor 
accessible, and hence it cannot be changed. It must be assumed to provide the best 
solution to the sub-model under consideration. In the case where the local time step can 
be accessed and modified through the simulation, it can either be set by implementing an 
algorithm from numerical integration, or it can be set to “1” which represents one single 
time step from beginning to end of one global time step execution. By implementing the 
latter approach, the simulation engineer obtains full time step control over the sub-model. 
This is the best scenario for an adaptive time step as discussed here. 
2.4 Results discussion and future work 
The proposed approach for time stepping using an RKF23 algorithm has been discussed 
and implemented on a simple example problem. For this research, it is assumed that the 
co-simulation is set up and working correctly. The general issues relating to dynamic 
system M&S and co-simulation itself (such as algebraic loops, inter-model constraints, 
stability, etc.) have been studied for decades and are ongoing subjects in research and 
literature, but not subject of the research presented in this report. 
 
The algorithm has been shown to be a promising way of achieving a mathematically 
reasoned time step setting for co-simulation. It must be understood though, that this 
research is currently only at the beginning. It has been shown that the results, while 
acceptable, are not yet satisfactory. Also, once implemented properly for the simple 
example problem, the algorithm’s validity for general problems needs to be evaluated. 
 
The current main problem is the obtainment of the slopes of the state variables. It has 
been shown that there are cases of strong chattering. Since the simulation itself is 
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resistant against variable time steps, the time stepping algorithm itself is the cause of the 
deviations. The chattering and general behavior of the state derivatives is therefore 
subject to further investigations, and currently one of the main focal points. Some of the 
points to be taken into account have been discussed above. 
 
If the time stepping algorithm is implemented successfully, it must be extended to take 
into account different sub-model frequencies. Currently, the application is such that the 
simple example problem is composed of two sub-models with similar system dynamics. 
If however, there are two or more dynamic systems with different system dynamics 
integrated into a co-simulation, a time stepping algorithm should ideally be able to cope 
with this situation. Like in the solution of a set of ODEs (as discussed above), the 
algorithm needs to take into consideration the time steps necessary for each of the 
different dynamic systems. This will require a more sophisticated time stepping schedule. 
In particular, if there exist systems with slow dynamics and systems with fast dynamics, 
the fast systems might require far smaller time steps than the slow systems. The 
algorithm therefore needs to take into consideration that such deviations exist. Slower 
sub-models could be executed far less often than fast sub-systems. The missing data for 
the fast systems might be obtained through means of interpolation. Such an algorithm 
would greatly improve the co-simulation by significantly reducing the necessary 
computational load. 
 
Also an issue is the selection of a maximum time step (hmax in the notional RKF23 
algorithm). This is important because the algorithm itself might choose time steps that are 
reasonable with respect to the time stepping routine itself, but not acceptable for a 
dynamic simulation. This would be the case for example when a dynamic system goes 
through a phase of little to no change in state variable outputs. Subsequently, the 
algorithm would choose a higher and higher time step. If the simulation then comes 
across a steep change in system states, the algorithm would still be at too high a time step 
to properly capture such an event. The results would then become out of control. This 
behavior was also observes in the simple example double pendulum problem. By 
choosing a maximum time step, and possible implement a rollback algorithm, such 
problems can be prevented. However, the issue is how to find the maximum time step. In 
this example, methods from system analysis can be employed; however, this will be 
another main point of research focus, as system analysis has its drawbacks and is not 
generally applicable. 
Task 3: Surrogate Modeling of Fluid Cooling Systems 
3.1 Introduction  
The proposed tasks for this research include the implementation of the method of 
component surrogate modeling with graph-based integration to the fluid system model 
built in the DOMINO environment (denoted as “the DOMINO model” below), based on 
the successful development of the method in the early stage of the research. The objective 
of this research was to demonstrate the applicability of the developed surrogate modeling 




Although the graph-based surrogate modeling method was developed, tested, and 
demonstrated successfully using the notional YP fluid model, it was aware that the 
change of the original plan for  implementing the method  by using the DOMINO model 
was inevitable. This is because the use of the DOMINO model for this research might be 
restricted by the export control regulations.  As an alternative to the DOMINO model, the 
CW-RSAD model was chosen to perform the proposed research. There are two main 
reasons for choosing the CW-RSAD model as the proof of implementation: the CW-
RSAD model has been broadly used as a concept of demonstration in various research 
efforts supported by the U.S. Navy; and the system configuration of the CW-RSAD 
model seems complicated enough to reflect the real-world problem – or, at least, as 
complicated as the DOMINO model. In addition, the use of CW-RSAD model as the 
demonstrator reveals one of the advantages exhibited by the component surrogate 
modeling method with graph-based integration, which is the model reusability. The CW-
RSAD model is the one from which the notional YP fluid model originated so the 
component surrogate models generated for the notional YP fluid model can be reused 
without modification for creating the CW-RSAD surrogate model. 
 
In this section, the formulation of the method of component surrogate modeling with 
graph-based integration will be introduced and its implementation to the damage analysis 
of the notional YP fluid system will be discussed. Python, an object-oriented scripting 
language, is chosen as the development platform for this implementation. Then,  the 
application of the method to a larger system, the CW-RSAD model, will be conducted 
and the results will be presented and discussed.  
3.2 Research Details 
3.2.1 Component Surrogate Modeling with Graph-Based Integration 
This surrogate modeling method is capable of providing a flow-based engineering 
systems M&S environment that can treat the connection-topological configuration the 
network as a “design variable” or “noise variable” in design space exploration, design 
trade study, or design optimization process. As a result, this method will also enable a 
simulation-based design for resilience and survivability against propagating failures of 
the system.  
 
The method encompasses two key ideas: one is the surrogate modeling of the object-
oriented component models, and the other is the graph-based topological modeling that 
connects all the component surrogate models and manages the changes of the connections 
among them. As mentioned previously, the method will be described very briefly and 
demonstrated using part of the implementation of the notional YP fluid system. The 
comprehensive details of the method and its implementation to the notional YP fluid 
system can be found in [Moon, 2010]. 
3.2.1.1 Notional YP Fluid System Model 
Figure 39 depicts the Flowmaster V7 model of the notional YP fluid system. The notional 
YP fluid model consists of a pair of redundant pump-chiller sub-networks, seven heat 
exchanger units, and six thermal service loads. In the model, the heat exchanger units 
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HEX no. 4 and HEX no. 5 are redundant heat exchanges serving a single thermal load. 
Each heat exchanger contains either one or two (as redundancy) flow control valve(s). In 
this example, the system has 18 damage control valves, 11 flow control valves, and 10 
valves for load isolation. 
 
 
Figure 39: Flowmaster V7 Model of Notional YP-Fluid System (HEX: Heat 
Exchanger Unit) 
 
3.2.1.2 Definition of Components and Graph Representation 
The first step is to translate the notional-YP fluid model in Figure 39 into a graph 
representation that is composed of edges and nodes, such as the one shown in Figure 40. 
An interesting aspect of the graph model in Figure 40 is that it has 52 edges and 40 
nodes; however, all these graph components can be grouped into five different 
component types. A component type can be thought of as a class in object-oriented 
programming for generating multiple edge component instances with different values of 
certain properties. That being said, all the edge components can be represented by five 
component models that allow a few model properties, or model parameters, to be variable 
which can improve the model’s reusability. Table 3 is the list of the component models 
defined in the graph-based model representation. 
 
3.2.1.3 Generation of Component Surrogate Models 
The mathematical models of five component types listed in Table 3 are then generated 
using the recurrent neural network (RNN)-based surrogate modeling method [Moon, 
2010]. In this particular implementation, eight neural-net (NN) surrogate models were 
created to model the five different types of components. Table 4 shows the specification 





Figure 40: Graph Representation of Notional YP Fluid Model  




Table 3: Edge Component Types 
 
 






The YP fluid model is a scaled-down version of the CW-RSAD model, which indicates 
that all these NN component surrogate models can also be used for modeling the CW-
RSAD model.   
3.2.1.4 Component Model Integration Using Incidence Matrix of Graph Model and 
Simulation 
The strength of a graph model reveals when its various matrix forms are incorporated 
with numerical applications. One of the most frequently used matrix form of graph 
models may be the incidence matrix, which describes the connectivity of the network 
system. 
 
In the developed method, the incidence matrix of the graph model shown in Figure 40 is 
used as the “glue” of the edge component models. In simulation, the numerical solver 
algorithm uses the incidence matrix of the graph model and the flow rate outputted from 
the edge component models to generate the algebraic equations of the Kirchhoff’s 
Current Law (KCL) with the flow continuity constraints imposed by the system 
connection topology. Then, the solver finds, at each simulation time step, the pressure 
values at the nodes (i.e., the connection points of the edge component models) that satisfy 
the KCL constraints of the system. In this setting, multiple models with different 
connection topologies are generated with different incidence matrices, while still utilizing 
the same pool of component surrogate models.   
3.2.1.5 Damage Modeling  
For the flow system model based on the developed method, the damage in the flow 
system can be modeled by combining the connection topological changes of the model 
and the change in the properties of the component models resulted from the damage. 
Basically, the connection topological changes by damage are realized in the same way as 
for creating the model with a different connection topology – by modifying or changing 
the incidence matrix of the model, which makes modeling damage very easier than many 
other modeling approaches. Since the damage often causes the changes of the physical 
properties, such as the pipe lengths of the affected edge component models, the properties 
of the affected models are modified too. Figure 41 briefly describes how the damage is 
implemented to a simple water-based cooling system which consists of a single chiller, 
four heat exchangers, and three valves. In Figure 41, an explosion happens to the system, 
and the area that is influenced by the explosion is represented by a “damage bubble,” a 
sphere with the radius r. This simple damage modeling approach assumes that every part 
of the components that are inside this bubble is completely destroyed, so the simulation 
generates a new model topology and changes the component model properties according 
to the given damage, as shown in the model at the lower-left corner of Figure 41.  
3.2.1.6 Auto-Generation of the Damage Control System Model 
A damage analysis of a fluid network system without any damage control effort is 
meaningless, since the analysis would yield only a trivial solution of the total system 
failure by eventually shedding all the reserved fluid out of the system. In the notional YP 
fluid model and the CW-RSAD model, the automated damage isolation is done by the 
cooperative and reactive actions of the smart valves that equipped in the fluid network 
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system. The graph-based surrogate modeling method provides an algorithm for auto-
generation of a distributed damage control system model for the given model. This 
damage control model and auto-generation algorithm is particularly useful for performing 
simulation-based design for resilience of intelligent and reconfigurable fluid systems by 





Figure 41: Damage Modeling in Simple Fluid System  
(C: Water Chiller, P: Pump, HEx: Heat Exchanger) 
3.2.1.7 Simulation Settings 
For both the notional YP fluid model and the CW-RSAD model, the simulation ran with 
a discrete time step of 0.05 second, and throughout the whole simulation. The PC no.1 
(pump-chiller sub-network, see Figure 39) operated with a single pump turned on to a 
fixed speed of 200 rad/s (about 1910 RPM), while PC no.2 was off. When PC no.1 was 
damaged, the controller on PC no.2 turned the pump of the PC no.2 on in order to 
continue the system-level operation. For all simulation runs, the damage bubble 
representing the damage was set to a constant radius, which was 0.7. 
3.2.1.8 Comparison of Simulation Performance 
The analysis was performed with the simulation running for 5 seconds of simulation time, 
the total wall-clock time taken by the simulation with the original Flowmaster model and 
the graph-based surrogate model of the notional YP fluid system was measured. The 
result of this particular comparison test showed that the graph-based surrogate model 
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took 4.48 secs which was 12.6 times faster than the Flowmaster model, which took 56.48 
secs. However, on the other side, the graph-based surrogate model contained errors and 
biased information in its response based on the responses of the Flowmaster model. This 
trait is in fact common to every surrogate model due to the fact that the surrogate model 
is an approximation of a model. Despite of such a problem, the graph-based surrogate 
model would be very useful, especially for conduct analysis in the early phase of the 
design process. In practice, the Flowmaster model is not necessarily more accurate than 
the graph-based surrogate model when it comes to the early design stage because a large 
portion of the system details is yet unknown or not decided at all. Instead, what is needed 
more in the early design stage is a computationally affordable model that allows a 
designer to run a large number of analysis cases for exploring as large a design space as 
possible, meaning that the graph-based model is an effective choice to meet such 
requirements.  
3.2.1.9 Damage Simulation and Analysis 
In this analysis, the system was closed by the reference damage control, and 28 
simulations are compared, each of which has a different damage location. Figure 42 
shows the comparison of the open-loop and the closed-loop responses of the graph-based 
surrogate model with the same damage condition. In Figure 42(a), right after the rupture 
occurred at one second point of the simulation, the closed-loop system had a similar 
sudden drop of flow rate as the open-loop system, but eventually settled into a new 
recovered steady state. Although Figure 42 shows only one of the 28 results with the 
different damage conditions, the behaviors of other cases should be similar to Figure 42. 
 
 
    (a) Flow Rate at SVC no.1                 (b) Total Rupture Flow and Valve Inputs 
Figure 42: Comparison of Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Responses of YP-Fluid 
Model with Rupture at (7, 4, 0) 
 
In order to quantify and measure the system recovery performance for every simulation 

































q  (27) 
where, oiq  and 
f
iq (i = 1,…,7) are the initial and the final values of the volumetric flow 
rate, respectively, at the 7 heat exchanger units, and  jw (j = 1,…,6) are the weight 
coefficients for the six service loads in the system. In Equation (26), the terms 
),max( 544
oo qqw ⋅  and )~,~max( 544
ff qqw ⋅  reflected that the two heat exchangers SVC no.4 
and SVC no.5 are redundant.  
 
The OCR is in a scale of 0 to 1 which represents a measure of how well the recovered 
system held its chilled-water delivery capacity from the level of the system before 
damage. Given the formulation of Equation (26), the OCR strongly relies on the right 
choice of the weight coefficients which represent the service load priorities based on 
customer requirements, mission profile, and design philosophy. In this example, they 
were chosen by the author for demonstration purpose and given in Table 5. 
 
A system's recovery performance should not be measured only using the final system 
state but also by how fast the system recovered. The OCR in Equation (26) was not 
formulated in this way just because the model with the reference control model has no 
control-induced delay in damage control efforts. However, in the real application, the 
recovery speed must be taken into account in the formulation of OCR.  
 
Figure 43 presents the result of the damage analysis resulting from the 28 damage cases. 
 
 
Figure 43: Operation Capability Rates for Notional YP Fluid Model 
 




In Figure 43, the average value of the OCR in the damage analysis was 0.80 meaning that 
the system's overall capability to recover from a single rupture was quite good, although 
the system still had room for improvement. The result has a few interesting patterns, one 
of which was that simulations 8, 18, 23, and 25 did not only yield the four lowest OCR 
values but also had all the same damage area, which was the mid-area of the system or 
more specifically, the bypass pipelines. This particular pattern in the analysis result 
clearly shows where to start for a more survivable and resilient system design. As a next 
step, a design engineer can create a number of design alternatives with different schemes 
of control strategy, valve placement, bypass pipeline placement, or service load locations, 
and then perform the same routine of modeling and damage analyses discussed above to 
the group of design alternatives in an automated manner.  
3.2.2 Damage Simulation of CW-RSAD Surrogate Model  
3.2.2.1 CW-RSAD Model 
In this section, the graph-based component surrogate modeling method will be applied to 
the CW-RSAD system for the damage simulation. The CW-RSAD model is a larger scale 
fluid system model, and Figure 44 shows the overall layout of the CW-RSAD fluid 
system, and the right side is the bow of the ship. The software model of the CW-RSAD is 
developed using  Flowmaster V7. There is a slight difference between the layout shown 
in Figure 44 and the layout of the CW-RSAD Flowmaster model: in the original CW-
RSAD model, both the AC plants are located in the aft of the ship.  
 
 





In order to achieve greater survivability and resilience of the shipboard engineering 
system, the CW-RSAD comprises redundant heat exchangers for the thermal service 
loads that are vital to ship operation such as CIC room HVAC, C&D system cooling, and 
director equipment room. As a result, the CW-RSAD has 16 heat exchangers that serve 
the 13 shipboard thermal service loads. In comparison, the notional YP fluid system has 7 
heat exchangers and 6 service loads. 
3.2.2.2 Graph Representation and Generation of CW-RSAD Surrogate Model 
Similar to the application to the notional YP fluid system, the first step in this 
implementation is to define the graph representation of the CW-RSAD system, which is 
shown in Figure 45. This graph representation is based on the CW-RSAD Flowmaster 
model so the bow is on the left side of the graph model, and the two AC plants (PC 
components in the graph model) are located in the aft of the model.  
 
To develop the  CW-RSAD surrogate model, the component surrogate models created for 
the notional YP fluid model can be reused, which is one of the great advantages of the 
component surrogate modeling approach. The model types used for modeling the 
components are also shown in the graph representation in Figure 45. The specifications of 
the model types are listed in Table 3. 
 
 
Figure 45: Graph Representation of CW-RSAD Flowmaster V7 Model 
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3.2.2.3 Damage Simulation 
With the graph representation of the CW-RSAD model and the definition of the 
component models for the M&S algorithms implemented in Python, the incidence matrix 
and the reference damage control system model are auto-generated. In order to conduct 
the damage simulation, 48 damage bubble locations are defined in a way that considers 
all the damage possibilities uniformly. Simulation is run for each of the 48 damage cases 
as a damage scenario. The rest of the damage simulation setting is identical with that of 
the notional YP fluid model. 
 
The system’s damage recovery performance is also measured by the OCR, which is 




AOCR =  (28) 
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In Equation (28), all the notions are with the same as those used in Equations (26) and 
(27). The value of the weights wj (j = 1,…,13) and the corresponding heat exchanger 
units, whose flow rates are qi (i = 1,…,16), are defined  in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Service Load Weights and Mapping to Heat Exchanger Units 
 
 
Subsequently, the results of the damage simulations for the 48 damage cases  are 




Figure 46: Operational Capability Rates (OCR) of 48 Damage Cases  
 
In Figure 46, the simulations no. 0 to 19 cover the damages on the lower circular pipeline, 
the simulations no. 20 to 39 covers the damages on the upper circular pipeline, and those 
from no. 40 to 48 covers the damages on the mid-section bypass pipelines. Among the 
simulations no. 0 to 19, the ruptures of the first 10 simulations are located at the port side 
of the system, and the other 10 simulations are at the starboard side. As can be seen in 
Figure 46, the system generally has a lower recovery performance when there is a rupture 
at the starboard side, rather than the port side. Also, the results for the damages at the 
upper circular pipeline are very similar to those for the damages at the lower circular 
pipeline. The reason for this is that the configurations of the upper and lower pipelines 
are identical to each other. 
 
Table 7 presents additional information of the simulation results, including the health 
status of the heat exchangers of the CW-RSAD system after the damage occurs. The 
green color indicates that a particular heat exchanger is in operating condition, the red 
color means it is in damaged condition, and the black color means that the unit is turned 
off. 
 
Table 7 provides very useful information about failure recovery performance for different 
locations under consideration. For example, the simulations no.14 to 16 reveals that a 
rupture around the starboard mid-section area affects both of the redundant heat 
exchangers serving the same thermal service load “Director Equipment Room”. This 
implies that the placement of this redundancy is ill-designed and need to be improved 
when the design is corrected. Similarly, the simulations no.4 to 6 and 10 to 14, and most 
of the simulations with mid-section damage yields relatively more thermal service 
failures than the rest. This also means that there is a high potential of system survivability 
benefit by improving design for those areas, such as placing a few more smart valves for 





Table 7: Component Failure Status, CW-RSAD Model 
 
(a) Cases with Rupture Location in Upper Pipeline 
 










3.3 Future Works 
The future works involve further refining the graph-based component surrogate modeling 
method and expanding its application domain to the DC power systems. In order to 
achieve this goal, both the current method and M&S environment, which are developed 
heavily based on the application of fluid system, need to be revamped and reorganized. 
Additional development of simulation schemes that are more suitable to the simulation of 
DC power systems may be necessary. DC power component models will be generated by 
either physics-based modeling or surrogate modeling, depending on the computational 
demand of the power model.  
 
More extensively, thermal modeling modules must be developed in order to investigate 
the interactions between the DC power model and the fluid model. As for the test and 
evaluation of the extended capability of the graph-based modeling method, a simulation-
based design analysis will be performed in a similar way to the demonstration of the 
damage analysis for the fluid system presented in the previous research. 
 
Along with the modeling for the DC power system, a new or modified damage generation 
method will be formulated for the damage analysis. In the current damage generation 
approach, the probability of damage at different locations of the notional ship was not 
taken into account for the simplicity purpose. In this newly formulated damage analysis, 
the location and the size of each damage entity will be determined through a probabilistic 
analysis, which will be based on the historical data of naval surface combatants and 
engineers’ intuition.  
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